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Preface 
 
This project evolved from a long-running interest in deep socio-political 
trends. The first encounter with "deep trends" came with reading Fernand Braudel's 
Civilisation Matérielle, Economie et Capitalisme, XVe-XVIIIe which sparked an 
enduring interest in the "longue durée." Behind the fleeting political debates of the 
moment, are there deep, but detectable, underlying currents that slowly lead our 
societies in one direction or another, or are dealing with something more akin to the 
economists' fabled "random walk"? If such long trends exist, what is the relationship 
between them, contemporary events and the actions of current political leaders? Can 
one visionary leader take note of them and affect their course, potentially avoiding 
catastrophe and rejuvenating her nation, or are they truly as inexorable as Marx once 
thought the coming of the Communist revolution would be? A certain degree of path 
dependency is unavoidable and perhaps even desirable. However, if a particular 
society finds that the long-term implications of their current path are unwelcome for 
whatever reason, what does it take to shift the course of society? 
A polis is nothing without its people. So what could be more important than 
the question of the very survival of peoples, their continued existence across the 
generations? Indeed, the topic of demographic decline has seen a lot of attention in 
recent years. The fruits of this attention have been of varying quality, ranging from 
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the cautious and solid scholarly analysis, to sensationalistic books and articles, 
unburdened by any evidence or research, and yet proclaiming the imminent end of 
Western civilization. Yet it is the latter that have found a large and willing audience. 
That prophecies of doom sell better than sober analysis is hardly surprising. As the 
early 20th century Jewish-German philosopher Franz Rosenzweig eloquently 
declares: "Just as every individual must reckon with his eventual death, the peoples of 
the world foresee their eventual extinction, be it however distant in time. Indeed, the 
love of the peoples for their own nationhood is sweet and pregnant with the 
presentiment of death." (Rosenzweig and Galli 2005) And so it is that the advent of 
sub-replacement fertility in the advanced industrialized world in recent decades, and 
its subsequent spread to middle-income countries, has been meet with unease 
wherever it has occurred.  
More often than not, politicians have chosen to take action, vowing to end the 
demographic crisis through various policies and subsidies. Deliberate attempts to 
change the demographic structure of a country during peacetime are not new, dating 
back at least as far as the Roman Empire's policy of settling its veterans in the border 
provinces at the end of their service, possibly one of the decisive factors in the 
spreading of the Latin language across the empire. The second half of the 20th 
century has borne witness to many attempts to alter large-scale demographic realities. 
These have ranged from the tyrannical to the mild. In 1967, Romanian dictator 
Nicolae Ceauşescu issued a decree banning all forms of birth control, a multidecadal 
plan to push Romania towards 40 million people by 2000. In the opposite direction of 
lowering fertility we see India's voluntary sterilization campaigns in the 1970s under 
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Indira Gandhi, and yet more extreme China's draconic one-child policy and the 
horrendous stories of forced abortions that followed. Most states have chosen less 
coercive alternatives, and have mainly taken the form of welfare and tax-credits for 
children present in many advanced democracies.  
Why is a political scientist interested in fertility trends? Is this not something 
better left to the demographers and sociologists? While I am happy to concede to the 
demographers the data gathering and descriptive analysis that dominates much of the 
literature on fertility, I believe that the political implications of even small differences 
in fertility, when compounded across decades, are stunning in the breadth of political 
implications. While sociologists might discuss the deep cultural roots and social 
effects of changing fertility patterns, I am more interested in the contexts in which 
population policies are effective or not. Why do child subsidies work in some 
countries but not in others? Moreover, the great fiscal debates that dominate discourse 
on both sides of the Atlantic in the early years of the second decade of the 21st 
century are firmly rooted in demographic causes. Simply put, for decades, European 
women in many countries have had fewer children than would have been needed to 
support prevailing levels of entitlements. The aging population of post-war baby 
boomers is understandably reluctant to vote towards slashing its own pensions and 
delaying its own retirement. Similarly, while beyond the scope of the current work, 
the hot button topic of immigration and the accompanying fears of demographic 
replacement are also much more clearly understood through the demographic lens.  
A majority of the work scholars have done in the field of demography, even 
when specifically discussing political consequences, is at the level of a single country, 
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and otherwise over a limited time horizon. By contrast, the data used for this work 
span a large number of countries across three decades. Demography is destiny, or so 
goes the bon mot, and there is a great deal of truth to that. In this work, I will try to 
show that it is not entirely a one-way street. Demographic trends are slow and 
"sticky," it is true. However, they do not escape entirely from the orbit of politics, but 
instead both transient and stable political events affect demographic outcomes in deep 
and meaningful ways. This work will be an exploration of this relationship.  
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ABSTRACT 
 
Total fertility rates have been falling across the world, with a majority of the world's 
countries and population now below generational replacement rate. Contrary to the 
initial assumption that women are merely delaying child-birth, in some advanced 
industrial countries the sub-replacement fertility trend has persisted for decades, 
indicating permanently lowered fertility expectations. This study looks at the 
differences and similarities between low fertility countries and those who have 
bounced back towards replacement levels. I use micro-level data from the World 
Values Survey to assess cultural shifts that relate to individual-level fertility 
decisions, as well as macro-level data to evaluate country-level conditions and, when 
either direct or indirect pro-natalist policies are in place, policy effectiveness. The 
results show a combination of cultural change and either family-friendly labor market 
norms or government intervention can indeed lead to a sustained rise in total fertility. 
However, other cultural, historical and political factors might delay or prevent policy 
adjustment. 
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Chapter 1 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
  
Research Topic 
 
Joseph Rudyard Kipling is nowadays mostly remembered for his children's tale The 
Jungle Book (Kipling 1897). Yet at the start of the 20th century he was better known for 
his poems, interpreted then as praising British imperialism at a time when maps showed a 
quarter of the world's land mass painted reddish pink with the colors of Britain, the 
largest empire in all history. None but himself can say what the author's intent was, of 
course, and yet a tone of chastisement against the sin of hubris pervades the man's work: 
"Our pomp of yesterday/ Is one with Nineveh and Tyre," he writes in the Recessional, 
referring to the ruins of powerful cities from biblical times. After the First World War, 
which claimed the life of his only son, his tone becomes darker still. In his 1919 poem, 
The Gods of the Copybook Headings (Beecroft 1956), he issues a dire warning: 
 "On the first Feminian Sandstones we were promised the Fuller Life 
 (Which started by loving our neighbour and ended by loving his wife) 
 Till our women had no more children and the men lost reason and faith, 
 And the Gods of the Copybook Headings said: "The Wages of Sin is Death." 
 
 These four lines together summarize rather well the topic of this dissertation. The 
first alludes to female emancipation and to the quest for self-fulfillment and self-
expression that has become one of the driving forces of modernity. The second 
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foreshadows what came to be known half a century later as the sexual liberation 
movement, an earthquake that changed family and social dynamics fundamentally in the 
past half-century, with no way (and likely no desire) to go back to the status-quo-ante. 
The third line predicts the persistent decline in fertility rates across the globe; and finally, 
the last line hints at the potential threat the abovementioned fertility trend seems to pose 
to the continuation of the very civilization that gave rise to these changes.  
 This work, then, is to be an academic encounter with the issues surrounding 
changing fertility rates, with a particular focus on the advanced industrial democracies 
that are spearheading this change. Why, despite similar levels of development and at 
least superficially similar policies, have some nations been stuck for decades with very 
low fertility while others are at or near population replacement levels? Why, for 
instance, does pro-family spending seem to boost fertility rates only in some instances 
and not in others? 
Declining fertility around the world suggests that other countries are following the 
path of the advanced industrial states. Therefore, gaining a better understanding of the 
determinants of fertility will allow us to predict demographic trends in the developing 
world more accurately. For instance, would China's fertility rebound if the government 
were to abolish the one child policy tomorrow? More generally, why does pro-family 
spending seem to produce results in some countries but not in others?  
 Northern Europe and many of the Anglophone countries are anomalous compared 
to other members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), a club of relatively rich and relatively free countries. After a bout 
of low fertility in the 1980s and 1990s, the former have climbed back to levels 
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approaching and in some cases even exceeding replacement levels. Meanwhile, the rest 
of the OECD members (and many poorer countries) have remained at the previous low 
levels, or plunged even deeper into what demographers now call lowest of the low 
fertility rates. The phenomenon of rising fertility is restricted to a mere handful of 
countries and relatively new, as scholars have taken note of it after the turn of the new 
millennium. What is the cause of this dramatic divergence? Does it go back to some 
fundamental cultural difference that we can trace back centuries, as Putnam does in his 
famous analysis of the differences between Northern and Southern Italy? (Putnam, 
Leonardi et al. 1994) If so, we would have to resign ourselves to watch the slow and 
inexorable march of demography, some nations perhaps tragically doomed by their very 
culture diminish into dust. It would be the stuff of Greek plays: the prosperity of the 
parents coming at the expense of the grandchildren. It is undeniable that modernization 
has spread like wildfire and is set to engulf the entire world within a few short decades. 
Fertility decline follows wherever modernization touches (UN Secretariat 2009). If the 
drivers behind this change are indeed as glacially slow moving as social trust in Putnam's 
analysis of Italy, one can only shudder to think what a grim fate awaits much of the 
world, as populations freed from subsistence and empowered with reproductive control, 
choose not to engage in inter-generational replacement, effectively breeding themselves 
out of existence in slow-motion. Economic and social change in the past was more 
gradual, with 3% annual growth rates considered exceptional, perhaps even perilously 
high back in the 19th century, and yet so many now developed countries are still 
struggling to adapt. With plenty of developing countries now growing at rates in excess 
of 9% per year, this much faster current pace of economic and social change is likely to 
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wreak havoc upon their cultures and societies, with so little time to adapt and prepare to 
deal with the pitfalls of modernity. 
 Some aspects of culture are faster to adapt than in Putnam's civic participation 
example. We have substantial survey evidence that at least some deeper level values are 
changing (Inglehart 1997). Perhaps norms relating to fertility are fast changing as well, 
and if so, then the rest of OECD can hope to join the Northern Europeans and the 
Anglophone countries sooner rather than later, and see their cultures preserved and 
enhanced by modernity, rather than extinguished. I seek to explore this hypothesis. In 
Chapter 2, I discuss how issues of differential fertility have shaped the world and have 
inflamed politics. In Chapter 3, I present an overview of three types of variables used to 
explain fertility: socio-economic indicators, government policies and cultural values. In 
Chapter 4, using two World Value Survey dimensions, I show cultural variables to be 
strong predictors of fertility levels within the OECD dataset, even when controlling for a 
host of other variables, including fixed country effects. Chapter 5 draws a conclusion 
from these findings and illustrates future research topics that arise from my findings. 
However, before I can begin my analysis, a brief overview of issues related to 
demography is perhaps necessary in order to familiarize the reader with some core 
concepts that I will use from here on.  
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 Measuring the Dependant Variable: Defining Fertility  
 
I am interested in cohort replacement across generations, in other words, whether the 
parents in a specific age cohort have enough children to maintain or increase that 
population across generations, given a specific mortality rate.  The simplest way to 
measure fertility is to count the number of children born. One potential measure for this is 
the crude birth rate, the number of children born per thousand women per year. However, 
using this measure of fertility would make comparisons between countries problematic, 
because different countries have different age structures and cohorts often are of unequal 
size, especially in the immediate aftermath of a fertility transition baby boom (see 
discussion below). As we know, women do not have children uniformly at all ages, and 
this means that using crude birth rates would distort the data. Alternatively, cross-country 
patterns of childbearing can be measured by both cohort and period indicators. Cohort 
indicators such as the completed fertility rate (CFR) assess the birth rate of women born 
in a given year as they attain the end of their reproductive cycle. These have the obvious 
disadvantage of only being able to give us an indicator for women exiting their 
reproductive cycle, leaving us in the dark with regards to more recent changes in fertility 
behavior. Moreover, with assisted reproductive technology, more and more women are 
having children later, bringing into question any methodology that uses a rigid age cut-off 
for completed-fertility.   
For these reasons, the core variable that I will be using instead throughout this 
dissertation is the total fertility rate (TFR). The total fertility rate in a specific year is the 
number of children that would be born to each woman if she were to live to the end of her 
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childbearing years and if the likelihood of her giving birth to children at each age was the 
currently prevailing age-specific fertility rates (UN Secretariat 2009). It is generally 
computed by summing up the age-specific fertility rates defined over five-year birth-
cohorts.  Assuming there are no migration flows and that mortality rates remain 
unchanged, a total fertility rate of 2.1 children per woman generates broad stability of the 
population: it is also referred to as the “replacement fertility rate” as it ensures 
replacement of the woman and her partner with another 0.1 "children" to counteract 
infant mortality. The figure might actually be higher for other countries with higher infant 
mortality rates (Espenshade, Guzman et al. 2003), but 2.1 is reflective of the replacement 
fertility rate for OECD members and other developed nations which are the focus of this 
dissertation. At fertility levels below 1.7 I will be talking about "low fertility" and at 
levels below 1.4 about "lowest of the low fertility" (Kohler, Billari et al. 2002; Billari and 
Kohler 2004).  
 
Two new explanatory variables 
 
One of the problems of the current literature on the determinants of fertility is the 
lack of an effective means of quantifying the otherwise intangible cultural aspects of 
fertility. There are numerous high-quality econometric analyses (Rosenzweig and 
Evenson 1977; Lillard 1993; Ehrlich and Kim 2007; Michaud and Tatsiramos 2008; 
Booth and Kee 2009; Day and Dowrick 2010).  Caldwell (1976; 1987; 1990) and others 
(Greenhalgh 1995; Fernandez and Fogli 2005) have performed numerous careful analyses 
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of the cross-societal and intergenerational cultural aspects of fertility. Hakim's work on 
preference theory (Hakim 2000) is an impressive blend of anthropological and 
econometric, but as a rule, as Sorkin noted decades ago, the amount of communication 
between sociologists and econometricians is very small (Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 1988), 
with econometricians often making heroic assumptions about values, preferences and 
tastes, and sociologists ignoring powerful secular trends to pursue niche theories.  
 I propose to use an aggregate set of measures generated from the 6 waves of the 
World Values Survey (WVS) project as consistent markers for national-level cultural 
traits. I am referring to Inglehart's (1997) two cultural value dimensions.  J. Feyrer et al. 
make use of World Values Survey data to assess fathers' readiness to assist in household 
chores related to childcare (Feyrer, Sacerdote et al. 2007), but they do not use any 
broader cultural measure, and even then they make only partial use of the dataset by 
separating the 2000 wave of the WVS. While that is a perfectly legitimate use of the 
dataset for a static estimation, a study of fertility dynamics can gain a lot more from using 
a time series dataset, since time series will render within-country and cross-regional 
patterns across time visible in a way that is simply not possible with a one-year snapshot.  
Moreover, since the divergence in TFR has gathered pace in recent years, having the 
most up-to-date survey coverage is essential. I was able to make use of matching 
questions from the recently released 2008-2009 European Values Study to augment the 
WVS dataset, as well as incoming data from the latest ongoing wave of the WVS (2011-
12). This analysis has the advantage that it can make use of new data, in terms of recent 
demographic variables but most importantly in respect to new cross-national survey-data. 
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In Exploring the Unknown, R. Inglehart and C. Welzel have shown that a set of 
macro-level predictors derived from analysis of WVS survey data are capable of 
accurately estimating the aggregate responses in subsequent surveys, even in countries 
not previously surveyed (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). If these two quantifiable measures 
of culture move in predictable ways and are indeed connected to fertility rates, then 
similar cultural estimators can improve the accuracy of future econometric models of 
fertility.   
 
Table 1.1: Components of the two cultural dimensions in Inglehart's analysis. From Inglehart 2000.  
 
The two cultural dimensions previously identified by Inglehart (1997; 2000) are the 
Traditional/Secular-Rational dimension and the Survival/Self-Expression dimension. The 
survey questions they derive from and their relative factor loadings are indicated in Table 
1.1 above.  
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 The Traditional/Secular dimension is indicative of a person's views on religion 
and traditional values, such as respect for authority, opposition to abortion, national pride 
and the importance of obedience and hard work. Negative scores on this dimension 
indicate a more traditional person, while positive score indicate an orientation towards 
the rational-secular end of the spectrum.  
 The Survival/Self-Expression axis is also a composite of several questions. First, 
whether the respondent's concern about his physical security leads him to prioritize that 
and economic security above self-expression and personal wellbeing, a measure of 
happiness, willingness to take political action, attitudes towards sexual minorities, and 
levels of trust. Negative values on the Survival/Self-expression dimension indicate a 
person more focused on survival whereas positive values indicate an orientation towards 
self-expression. 
 The idea of using national aggregates of these measures is not entirely new. 
Inglehart and Norris (2004) discuss the negative relationship between religious values 
and fertility rates. In this context, using WVS data from the mid-1990s wave, they 
produce a snapshot graphic showing a negative relationship between high 
Traditional/Secular-Rational values and fertility rates. Traditional/Rational encode a set 
of values associated with attitudes towards religiosity. Previous work has shown that a 
population exhibiting high levels of religious belief (Mosher, Williams et al. 1992) and 
praxis (Skirbekk, Kaufmann et al. 2010) tends to exhibit higher fertility, and several of 
the largest religions actively encourage large families, discourage contraception and 
strongly oppose abortion. Using the WVS data from 1981-1995, Inglehart and Norris 
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show that the Traditional/Rational-fertility rate relationship holds even when controlling 
for the level of economic development (Inglehart and Norris 2004, 232-239).  
 
Topic Relevance 
 
There are large cross national differences in fertility between the highest fertility 
country (currently Niger, with a 2010 TFR of 7.0) and the lowest (Hong Kong, whose 
TFR is now 1.0).  However, the socio-political implications of even small differences in 
fertility, when compounded across decades, are stunning. If Italy were to maintain the 
TFR it had in 2002 (1.3) for 45 years, given its current age structure, its population would 
decline by 50%, (Harris 2006, 48)  a level of population loss not even matched by the 
Black Death in the 14th century (Gottfried 1985). While prima-facie, such a prolonged 
period of low fertility might seem unlikely, it bears keeping in mind that the last time 
Germany has seen a fertility level above 1.5 was in 1975.  In Germany, this 35 year 
window is sufficient to reject assumptions that the lower TFRs might simply reflect 
delayed fertility, since the period is long enough for at least one cohort to go through its 
entire reproductive life to completed fertility. Even with generous assumptions about 
birth postponement (Sobotka 2004), the fertility rates remain far below replacement. 
Bloom et al (2009) reach similar conclusions: "Without substantial adjustments in labor 
force participation or migration policies, the potential negative repercussions on the 
European economy are large." 
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In 2009, there were 74 countries that had fertility rates below replacement, and 37 
below 1.6 births per woman. The governments of each of these 37 countries have 
reported to the United Nations that they consider this rate “too low” (See Appendix). 
When fertility is below replacement level only by a small amount, the size of following 
generations falls only gradually and, if considered necessary, there is ample opportunity 
to supplement the generation size with migration. When fertility remains very low, 
however, the generation size falls rapidly and only massive immigration can offset the 
decline (United Nations 2000). There is evidence also that very low fertility, on average, 
is counter to the preferences of individuals experiencing it (D'Addio 2005).  
German workers were recently outraged when their government decided to help 
bail out fellow EU member state Greece, whose budgetary deficits were so large that 
default seemed likely. Among the main causes of the Greek deficit are the mandatory 
expenses of the state pension fund. Part of this has to do with irresponsible policies. 
While in Germany the retirement age is 67, in many a case a Greek would be able to 
retire at a mere 55. Moreover, while in Germany the median worker can expect his 
pension to be about 60% of his working wage, for Greece, the median worker's pension 
would be an unbelievable 110% of the net median wage. (OECD data). But the 
fundamental causes go far deeper than a few short-sighted politicians. Figure 1.1 below 
shows Greece's population pyramid. Its thinning base once temporarily lowered the youth 
dependency ratio, in what demographers call a demographic window - it was by taking 
advantage of this window that countries like Taiwan and Korea blossomed into wealth. 
However, for Greece, the window is now slamming back closed, threatening to shatter 
the window-frame and let in the cold winter air — Greece's long term demographic 
 prospects are grim indeed
outnumbered them in population 3:1 in 1950, sporting 21 million citize
then 7.6 million. In 2100, under a UN projection 
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Figure 1.1: Greek Population Pyramid
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The great fiscal debates that dominate discourse on both sides of the Atlantic in 
the early years of the second decade of the 21st century are firmly rooted in demographic 
causes. Fiscally, the problem is that fundamentally, many of the social protection 
programs were set up with the structure of Ponzi schemes - pay as you go funds that 
could stay above water if and only if the populations paying into them continued to grow. 
Instead, for decades now, European women in many countries have had fewer children 
than would have been needed to even replace the current generation, never mind support 
prevailing levels of entitlements in the context of lengthening life-expectancies. The large 
and aging population of post-war baby boomers is understandably reluctant to vote 
towards slashing its own pensions and delaying its own retirement, making reform 
difficult. Similarly, while beyond the scope of the current work, the hot button topic of 
immigration and the accompanying fears of demographic replacement are also much 
more clearly understood through the demographic lens.  
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Chapter 2 
Chapter 2 Demographic Overview 
 
 
Population and Fertility  
 
In the Hebrew Bible, after drowning the entirety of humankind aside from the 
patriarch Noah and his family in a massive flood, God instructs the survivors to be 
fruitful and multiply upon the earth. While that is a mythical account, the scientific 
evidence does in fact suggest that about 73,000 years ago, the human race almost went 
extinct. A recent analysis of mitochondrial DNA evidence indicates that at that time the 
entire human population was reduced to under 15,000 individuals, perhaps as low as 
2,000 (Williams 2011). The cause appears to have been not flood but fire: by far the 
largest volcanic event in over 2 million years, the massive Mount Toba eruption plunged 
the Earth into a long period of severe climatic disruption (Jones 2010). From this almost 
Noahide start, it took humanity 73,000 years to reach a population of 1 billion, an average 
annual growth rate of 0.00018% – a near stasis. Reverend Thomas Malthus, one of the 
grandfathers of demography, famously wrote that human capacity for population growth 
was exponential, and would necessarily outpace the resources available to them at any 
given time, which he assumed would grow at a linear pace. Humans were therefore 
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doomed to live on the edge of subsistence. Insufficient harvests would lead to famine, 
plague and war, keeping human populations from growing faster than food supplies 
(Malthus 1798). For thousands of years the laws of Malthus seemed to apply in their full 
cruelty, and a plethora of diseases and calamities took their awful toll, ravaging the ranks 
of both newborns and adults, keeping human populations in check. Growth was slow. 
Then something happened. After topping 1 billion as late as 1804, humankind reached 
the second billion mark a mere 123 years later, in 1927. Growth seemed only to 
accelerate from there: 3 billion in 1960, 4 billion in 1974, 5 billion in 1987, 6 billion in 
1999, and 7 billion toward the end of 2011.  
Earth Population Change, 
billions 
Years required to gain another billion 
                     Low                   Medium                      High 
0-1   73,000  
1-2  123  
2-3  33  
3-4  14  
4-5  13  
5-6  12  
6-7  12  
7-8 (projection) 24 14 10 
8-9 (projection) ∞ 18 11 
9-10 (projection) ∞ 41 11 
Table 2.1. Time to Increase by 1 billion. Source: UN estimates, Low, Medium and High Projections 
Looking below at Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2, we can see the current countries of the 
world with their surface areas distorted by the estimated relative population in their 
respective territories in the given year. Countries that account for a lot of the Earth's 
population compared to their area will be larger than they would be on a normal map, 
while under-populated countries are smaller than they would otherwise be. We can see 
that in both figures Australia and Canada are almost invisible, because they have a vast 
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area and a very small population, while India and Bangladesh's burgeoning populations 
make the countries larger than they would be on a standard map. 
  
 
Figure 2.1. The Map of the World, with countries distorted according to population, 1900. UN estimates.  
 
Figure 2.2. The Map of the World, with countries distorted according to population. Projected, 2050. UN 
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  Now, comparing the first map, the world's population in 1900, with the projection 
for 2050 we can see that the growth in the world's population has not been (and is not 
expected to be) uniform across time and space. Instead, the dramatic growth started in 
Europe, with the advent of the complex set of technological, social, political and 
economic changes we have come to refer to as the Industrial Revolution (Caldwell 2008).  
Looking at the image of the bulging European continent set astride a thinly populated 
Africa, we can perhaps have a clearer sense of how in 1900 the people of Europe 
represented 25% of the world's population, which was the highest share of the world's 
population ever attained by Europe (Maddison 1997). In 1900, there were more people in 
Europe than on all the continents but Asia taken together! Seen in this context, it is a 
tempting oversimplification to look at the outward European migrant flow and colonial 
expansion in the 19th century as if it were as inevitable as a gas law. However, the flow 
soon reversed its direction: as the means of increasing food yields and decreasing child 
mortality slowly spread across the world, the rest of the world's population started 
increasing rapidly.  
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Figure 2.3. Population Projections given four sets of assumptions. UN. 
By 2050, Europe's share of the world's population will have fallen far below its long-
term historical average of 20% (as seen in Table 2.2 below) to an astonishing 7%. For the 
1999-2050 interval the UN prognosis has Africa gaining another billion inhabitants, 
while Europe is set to diminish by over 100 million. If the UN predictions are accurate, 
Africa will have roughly three times as many people as Europe: an astonishing 
transformation.  
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Table 2.2: World Population Estimates, UN 
There is yet another way to illustrate just how unique our current circumstances are in 
history. The chart below, Figure 2.4, is based on estimates from Angus Maddison, and it 
shows that over 25% of all person-years ever lived took place in the 20th century. The last 
century was also responsible for 55% of all the GDP humankind ever generated, and 
since then, during the first 10 years of the 21st century, we produced 23% of all the GDP 
ever created (Maddison 1997, 2010 data update by Economist). 
 
 Figure 2.4: A quarter of all the people who ever lived were alive in the 20th century. The Economist.
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contribute from an early age. Population is at a relatively stable, relatively low 
level.  
2. In the decreased mortality, high fertility phase, due to improvements in personal 
hygiene, better food safety, cleaner water supply and (more recently) advanced 
medicine, death rates drop precipitously. Birth rates remain high, resulting in a 
population explosion. Caldwell and others argue that the length of time a society 
will remain in stage 2 has to do with how fast the costs of children are rising, 
turning them from a purely economic perspective, from net assets into net 
liabilities (Caldwell 1982, 201). As long as children can produce a net income 
with low investment, people will have more of them. (Becker and Lewis 1974) 
Twopeny's account of Australian life around 1880 shows that children were 
certainly not pampered: 
 "A description of the home of a carpenter around 1880 makes the point 
that he was well-housed compared with his fellow tradesmen who did not 
immigrate from Britain, but goes on to describe the house as containing, in 
addition to the kitchen, a room shared by the two youngest children, the 
carpenter and his wife, and an adjacent small room for the four other 
children. Children rarely saw doctors or dentists". (Twopeny 1973, 46) 
 
3. Decreased mortality, decreasing fertility phase. This is the first stage of fertility 
decline. Fertility in Europe and its offshoots started declining even before the 
advent of modern contraception, which may be interpreted as a rational response 
to rising costs of parenthood (Caldwell 1976; Hureaux 2000). In Caldwell's 
thorough analysis of Australia and Britain in the late 19th century, it was the 
delayed onset of marriage that was the primary driver of this reduction (Caldwell 
1982, 185) as men and women were expected to be able to afford their own 
household prior to marriage. As the use of birth control becomes culturally 
 acceptable and reliable, 
the labor force, the prevalence of birth control increases, dramatically reducing 
fertility. At this point, the first fertility transition is ongoing.
4. Low mortality, low fertility phase
the mid-1980s), at this stage mortality and fertility have reached a new 
equilibrium, and population is stable.
heavily.  
5. Low mortality, below replacement fertility phase
on which the idea that birth rates and death rates would actually reach 
at replacement. In stage 5 countrie
replacement levels. 
if the dual transition model is correct. This would imply global population decline 
once all countries reach this level. 
 
  
Figure 2.5: A simplified model of the Fertility Transition Theory. 
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Figure 2.6: Total Fertility Rates by Region. Only the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa remain significantly 
above replacement. 
The world seems well on its way towards these transitions. As can be seen in Figure 
2.6, with the notable exception of a handful of countries in sub-Saharan Africa that have 
remained mostly rural and agricultural, total fertility rates have been decreasing across 
the world. By 2012, many of the industrialized countries in the OECD would be entering 
their fourth decade of below replacement fertility rates, and many still developing 
countries will have dipped below replacement as well. This development was not 
anticipated. Instead, demographers were expecting only continued relentless growth.  
 
 Demography as a Political Issue 
 
It was only a few decades ago that demographers and laymen fretted about the 
crisis of overpopulation, and not just in distant places overseas, but at home too. In 
Richard Fleischer's 1973 classic Soylent Green¸ a science fiction film starring Charlton 
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Heston as a detective in the year 2022, the director depicted a desert-like, overpopulated 
and impoverished United States where things had gotten so desperate that the population 
survived on soylent green, a substance produced from the industrially-processed remains 
of the dead (Fleischer and Heston 1973). Judging by the tone of books and papers1 on the 
topic of population that were being published at the time, Fleischer almost comes across 
as an optimist. P.R. Ehrlich's very influential Population Bomb (1968) famously (and 
erroneously) predicted world-wide resource depletion, starvation and the inevitable death 
of hundreds of millions in "famines of unbelievable proportions"  before 1975. Ehrlich 
received a MacArthur Foundation Genius award for his work. According to the narrative, 
more people were bad for the planet, almost like a terminal cancer: 
"There is an alarming parallel between the growth of a cancer in the body of an 
organism and the growth of human population in the earth's ecological economy. 
... Cancerous growths demand food; but so far as I know, they have never been 
cured by getting it. The analogies can be found on our plundered planet. [...] How 
nearly the slums of  our great  cities  resemble the necrosis of tumors raises the 
whimsical query: Which is the more offensive to decency and beauty, slums or 
the fetid detritus of a growing tumor?" (Gregg 1955) 
Moved by this spirit of doom, in 1980 the same Dr. Ehrlich had confidently made 
a bet on the prices of five metals in 1990 against the famous economist  Julian R. Simon, 
convinced that explosive population growth would drive the prices relentlessly upward 
(Tierney 1990). Ehrlich turned out to have been wrong on all five metals, just as his 
predictions of doom from the Population Bomb never came to pass. Nonetheless, he 
remained an influential and respected figure. Indeed, there are still neo-Malthusians who 
                                                          
1 For a very comprehensive discussion of the dark Eugenic past of the birth control movement, see 
Fred Pearce's "The Coming Population Crash and Our Planet's Surprising Future, pp 33-87. I will skip the 
inter-war period and Nazi era in this review. 
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claim that crisis and mass starvation was averted only temporarily, due to the unexpected 
advent of the green revolution, but in fact overpopulation is still an ominous looming 
global threat (Hartmann 2009). 
The doom scenarios generated vigorous political support in the West in favor of 
promoting birth control at home and abroad. In India, Indira Gandhi initiated a policy of 
voluntary vasectomy. The government would pay its citizens the equivalent of $6 to 
undertake the vasectomy, and during the terrible famine of 1967, many did. It didn't seem 
to decrease fertility fast enough, so after assuming emergency powers in 1975, Mrs. 
Gandhi's New Population Policy stated that "where [an Indian] state legislature, in the 
exercise of its own powers, decides that the time is right and it is necessary to pass 
legislation for compulsory sterilization, it may do so." Eventually, the policy would cost 
her the election. (Pearce 2010, 64) In China, with no elections to contend with, the 
Communist Party instituted a one-child policy in 1978, resulting in forced abortions, 
increased female infanticide, and an estimated 400 million fewer Chinese (Skalla 2004), 
all because of calculations based on demographic projections. Millions of dollars in 
funding from Western donors and governments continued to flow, and birth control 
spread into the developing world rapidly decreasing family sizes, just as the Green 
Revolution spearheaded by Dr. Norman Borlaug's research teams dramatically boosted 
agricultural yields.  
Ironically, 1973 –the year Soylent Green came out– was also the first post-
Depression year when the US experienced sub-replacement fertility, and the US would 
not reach replacement level again until 2007, although its population continued growing 
throughout thanks to reduced mortality rates and continued high immigration. The sense 
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of urgent population crisis at home and abroad only slowly abated, and to some extent 
still pervades public culture. 
By the late 1990s, writing about the dangers of overpopulation had decidedly gone 
out of fashion and instead the opposite fear emerged among trendy academic types. "Is 
modernity against life?" asked Roland Hureaux, French political scientist and journalist, 
in his book Le temps des derniers hommes (2000). After an overview of the European 
population attrition due to low birth rates, examining fertility decline starting in 18th 
century France and continuing to the present day, and subjecting the standard models of 
fertility to a withering critique, Hureaux answers his own question in the positive. He 
concludes that "confronted with the most basic of choices, that between to be and not to 
be, our society, insidiously, appears to have chosen not to be" (Hureaux, 286). P. 
Longman, in The Empty Cradle, fears that falling birthrates "threaten world prosperity" 
(2004). While economists warn that declining populations will require large-scale 
immigration to keep the economy running and the pension funds afloat, some use the 
demographic figures to argue against immigration.  In Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis, Bat 
Ye'or argues, in a rather acerbic and combative tone, that cultural loss of confidence 
brought about by declining native population will lead Europeans into "dhimmitude" and 
an eventual takeover of Europe by North African and Middle Eastern immigrants (Ye or 
2005). Although demographers have pointed out that in terms of population dynamics 
such a scenario is very unlikely, some have been more receptive. Niall Ferguson, a 
Harvard professor, called her claims "credible." (Ferguson 2004)  Fellow historian and 
Middle East expert Bernard Lewis agreed: "Europe will be Islamic by the end of the 
century."  (Caldwell 2004). Others are not so concerned with immigration but more 
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pragmatically ask: "Who will do the work? Who will pay the taxes?" (Harris 2006). L.J. 
Kotilkoff warns that if the present demographic trends don't improve "our kids will face 
lifetime net taxes twice the rate that those we face" (Kotlikoff and Burns 2005).  
Considering how the dire predictions of the overpopulation scare literature have 
been spectacularly wrong, it is tempting to discount the underpopulation worries as just 
more of the same.  We have seen that alarmist books attract more attention and probably 
sell better too. Nonetheless, could it be that far-below replacement fertility is here to 
stay? Two observations argue against this conclusion. First, the decline was never a 
universal characteristic of developed countries.  Several western countries have never 
dipped far below replacement rate. The United States briefly probed the 1.7 level in the 
late 70s, during the Carter years, but has maintained a steady course around 2.0 ever since 
the early 90s. Uniquely among industrialized countries, Israel's TFR has never fallen 
below 2.7. Much of that is attributable to the tendency of members of the Hassidic 
religious minority to have numerous children, but the secular Jews have above 
replacement TFR as well (Remennick 2008). Iceland and Ireland have both stubbornly 
and almost continually reported above 2.0 TFRs.  Second, after plunging to the lowest of 
the low levels (<1.4 TFR) in the early years of the first decade, fertility rates have risen 
throughout most of Europe, although they remain for the most part well below 
replacement. Nonetheless, big, economically important countries such as Germany and 
Japan have had TFRs in the neighborhood of 1.3 for over two decades now, while Korea 
had been below 1.3 for over a decade. Singapore, despite impassioned pleas by the 
government, has seen an unrelenting decline in fertility to below 1.3 as well, while Hong 
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Kong, possibly because it is a crowded metropolis to begin with, has been spearheading 
the downward trend, placing almost consistently below 1.0 TFR since 1999.  
 Are the pessimists right this time? In order to answer this question, we must gain 
a better understanding the determinants of the variation of fertility rates. This is the 
purpose of the next chapter. 
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  2001 2009 Change 
Australia 1.73 1.90 0.17 
Austria 1.33 1.39 0.06 
Belgium 1.76 1.83 0.07 
Canada 1.51 1.66 0.15 
Chile 2.10 2.00 -0.10 
Czech Republic 1.15 1.49 0.35 
Denmark 1.75 1.84 0.10 
Estonia 1.34 1.63 0.29 
Finland 1.73 1.86 0.13 
France 1.88 1.99 0.11 
Germany 1.35 1.36 0.01 
Greece 1.26 1.53 0.27 
Hungary 1.31 1.33 0.02 
Iceland 1.95 2.22 0.27 
Ireland 1.96 2.07 0.11 
Israel 2.89 2.96 0.07 
Italy 1.25 1.41 0.16 
Japan 1.33 1.37 0.04 
Korea 1.30 1.15 -0.15 
Luxembourg 1.66 1.59 -0.07 
Mexico 2.60 2.08 -0.52 
Netherlands 1.71 1.79 0.08 
New Zealand 1.97 2.14 0.17 
Norway 1.78 1.98 0.20 
Poland 1.32 1.40 0.08 
Portugal 1.46 1.32 -0.14 
Slovak Republic 1.20 1.41 0.21 
Slovenia 1.21 1.53 0.32 
Spain 1.24 1.40 0.16 
Sweden 1.57 1.94 0.37 
Switzerland 1.38 1.50 0.12 
Turkey 2.37 2.12 -0.25 
United Kingdom 1.63 1.94 0.31 
United States 2.03 2.01 -0.03 
Table 2.3: Total Fertility Rates OECD countries 
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Chapter 3 
Chapter 3 Determinants of Fertility 
 
 
This is an overview of the determinants of fertility rates (TFR). I will focus initially 
on a discussion of those previously employed in the literature, and finally move on to the 
WVS-based predictors I plan to test. In discussing each potential determinant, I will 
present the evidence from extant academic studies and follow up with a brief empirical 
discussion, using to my data for each of the concepts. I do not expect the graphs and 
naive bivariate correlations in these subsections to provide us with explanations, only 
with more focused clues as to the phenomena that must be accounted for. At the end of 
each sub-section, following the literature and the descriptive data analysis, I will 
formulate a hypothesis regarding the effect of each variable on TFR. The determinants I 
will review fall into three broad categories: socio-economic indicators, incentives through 
government assistance, and cultural indicators.  There are also a number of direct 
biological determinants, such as duriation of lactational infecundability, frequency of 
intercourse, sterility, spontaneous intrauterine mortality, and the duration of the fertile 
period. I will not be considering these, because I consider them exogenous.   
There are numerous models describing potential determinants of TFR in the literature. 
In terms of causation models, they vary from the atheoretical correlation studies to full-
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fledged causal models. The vast majority come pre-packaged with a number of relatively 
strong ex-ante assumptions about the composition of the data, which are rarely explicitly 
discussed. To prevent the same from recurring in this paper, my strategy here will be to: 
1. Strive for a minimal set of assumptions; 
2. Add weaker assumptions first and stronger assumptions later. Make known 
potential ways in which the assumptions might lead the model astray explicit. 
3. Never add a covariant to the model that does not have a theoretical backing 
(no kitchen-sink approach).  
The process is not as objective as the list might lead one to think. By "weak" I do not 
mean "unsatisfactory" but rather I define weak and strong in terms of the size of the leap 
of faith required to accept it. I will work from the fundamental premise that the fewer 
leaps of faith are required to accept a model, the better the model. A weak-assumption 
model should be preferable, ceteris paribus, to a strong-assumption model.  This still 
leaves the issue of defining a way to separate the two, and here are a few of the criteria 
that I used: 
• Is there a clear causal mechanism to link the determinant and the variable of 
interest (in our case TFR)? For instance, there is a clear and logical link 
between the availability of birth control and fertility: women who do not have 
access to birth control who are fertile and are sexually active are much more 
likely to become pregnant than fertile and sexually active women who use 
birth control.  Indeed, we find that outside the OECD this factor is a strong 
predictor of fertility. "Availability of birth control" would thus be a weak 
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assumption, because it does not ask for much of a leap of faith. By contrast, a 
model that causally fertility with the prior presence of pets in the household 
(Serpell 1991) would require a lot more evidence to persuade me.    
• Is there ample extant literature on the subject, with strong empirical 
evidence and theoretical arguments? A strong prior basis in the literature will 
reduce the "strength" of the assumption. For example, while the exact causal 
pathway by which it occurs has remained disputed, there is vast literature on 
the effects of female literacy rates on subsequent fertility rates.  
• Is the theorized causal pathway unique? For instance, in the 1980s the 
relationship between the female labor force participation rate (FLFPR) and 
fertility rates was universally thought to be negative, yet in recent years 
studies are increasingly finding a positive relationship (Esping-Andersen 
2009). The older theories advanced the argument that women entering the 
labor force face higher opportunity costs for having children, and therefore 
have fewer. The newer story suggests that instead, women might feel more 
secure about their financial situation and are therefore more likely to exit the 
labor force temporarily to have children. I would consider a claim about to the 
sign of any linear effect of FLFPR on TFR to be a rather strong assumption. It 
is entirely possible that in at some level of economic development or at some 
level of male-female income inequality level the sign of the relationship flips, 
making linear relationship claims suspicious.   
• The model itself should be as simple as possible in terms of the statistical 
methods used and the ease of interpretability of the coefficients.     
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 To summarize, a strong set of assumptions is one that makes very specific demands 
of the data, while relying on sparse support in the extant literature, or facing conflicting 
claims in the literature. The more convoluted the statistical model, the greater the need to 
show why the complex model was necessary. 
The socio-economic indicators have been used the longest, and include measures of 
income, female labor force participation, part time employment, primary, secondary and 
tertiary education, infant mortality rates and even measures of urbanization. The causal 
relationship is not always straightforward, and scholars have often offered contrary causal 
stories. Not even the measurement of government intervention is as straightforward as 
one would hope. While governments usually keep records of their actions, these are not 
always made public. Furthermore, the channels for government assistance are almost as 
numerous as there are countries and vary from maternal/parental leave policies, to tax 
rebates and direct cash or in-kind assistance. Each of these also varies within the 
individual country over time, as programs are created, merged, replaced, repealed or 
enhanced. The bewildering diversity made it imperative to use a broad measure suitable 
for cross-national and cross-temporal comparisons.  I use a measure of total government 
spending for families, as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product. Sadly, this measure 
does not include the value of tax credits, and will therefore underestimate the amount of 
government assistance in countries like the U.S. that rely heavily on tax credits. Such 
gaps will have to be addressed in future work. Moreover, there is no way to judge 
effectiveness of individual spending programs that comprise it -- in other words in our 
model a dollar spent is a dollar spent, regardless of how effectively designed the policy it 
is spent on. These are not trivial problems, and will surely increase the error range of our 
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estimates. Nonetheless, I decided that the gains in comparability from reducing the array 
of non-comparable programs outweigh the loss. The final set of estimators I use is 
comprised of data derived from the World Values Survey. Data from the WVS has been 
used in the past in conjunction to research on fertility rates, with special attention given to 
questions that seemed relevant to fertility, such as the desired number of children and the 
attitude towards abortion. (see Feyrer, Sacerdote et al. 2007) I am interested in testing the 
use of the value-sets from WVS as potential predictors of fertility, by employing 
Inglehart's two value dimensions. As discussed in the introductory chapter, the two are 
generated from a factor analysis of multiple response items on the WVS. The two 
dimensions are labeled the traditional/rational-secular dimension and the survival/self-
expression dimension.  
 Problems of collinearly and data availability across the time series make a 
simultaneous test of all the variables impossible but a more in depth examination of the 
data and associated literature should help establish  a criterion for inclusion. 
  
Socioeconomic Indicators  
 
What determines fertility? Before I delve into macroeconomic indicators, I must first 
acknowledge that no model will be perfect. At the individual level, there is considerable 
heterogeneity in terms of preferences (Hakim 2003). In the Hakim worker-mother model, 
20% of women are strongly inclined towards children (home-centered) and would rather 
not work at all, 20% would put their career first (work-centered) and rather not have 
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children, and the remaining 60% are what she calls "adaptive" who desire a blend of both 
career and children. Preference heterogeneity can pose serious problems for an 
individual-level dataset that does not account for the possibility of non-uniform 
preference sets. If the desire to have children is shaped by many independent variables, 
the preference distribution would follow an asymptotically normal probability 
distribution function. I will assume that this is true and that therefore at the aggregate 
level of analysis these fluctuations in preference effectively cancel each other out at the 
population preference mean for each observation. Furthermore, according to the data in 
numerous surveys the stated population-level fertility preference is not identical to 
realized fertility outcomes in the population, but rather consistently below it. Women in 
most OECD sample nations, when asked, state a family size preference of 2 children or 
more (see Appendix), while realized fertility is significantly lower (D'Addio 2005). This 
could imply one of two things. First, the preferences stated in surveys are just "cheap 
talk," perhaps answering with a "socially acceptable" number, and realized fertility 
describes the true preference. Alternatively, it could mean that the process from desired 
to achieved fertility is contingent not only on individual preference, but also on the 
interaction with outside forces, resulting in a lower than desired fertility level (McDonald 
2006). McDonald's critique does not strike me as particularly sharp or pertinent. After all, 
what human action takes place outside of any institutional-structural framework? I will 
rely on achieved TFR rather than "desired" TFR.  
Figure 3.1 allows us to see the trends in fertility rates across the sample and over the 
past three decades. It seems that fertility has been declining in most of the countries over 
the observation period, with the steepest declines coming in the countries with the highest 
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fertility rates. This is in accordance to the fertility transition theory. We can see that the 
United States, France, the United Kingdom and Iceland have maintained near-
replacement fertility throughout the period studied, while countries like Germany, 
Austria, Canada and Belgium exhibit three decades of significantly below replacement 
rates, with little if any variation. The group of former Communist countries shows a 
similar trend, with near or above replacement fertility before 1989 and persistent low 
fertility afterward. The Northern countries, by contrast, tend to have higher fertility 
towards the end of the study period compared to the levels they had at the start of the 
period. 
 
Figure 3.1: Fertility in the Study Sample, by Country and Year 
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I do not expect that all mothers will necessarily sit down with a pen and paper and 
calculate the marginal costs and benefits. However, humans do respond to incentives, and 
their behavior is likely influenced at least to some degree by economic realities. Using an 
"altruistic parents" model (Barro and Becker 1989) Becker compares children to “durable 
goods,” and argues that demand will increase with a couple’s income and with a decline 
in the children's “price” (Becker, Duesenberry et al. 1960, 231).While thinking of 
children as durable goods might strike one as odd, the idea that increased affluence has a 
positive effect on fertility is not new. Adam Smith mentions it in the Wealth of Nations, 
stating that prosperity and growth leads to the "multiplications of the species" (Smith 
2009). Easterlin chose to emphasize the role of relative economic perception. The 
determinant, he argues, is not absolute wealth as much as the relative affluence of the 
potential parent's cohort, gauged against the remembered living standard of the cohort's 
parents (Easterlin 1973).  Butz and Ward take the opposite view: fertility is likely to be 
counter-cyclical, since during times of economic boom, the opportunity cost for potential 
mothers to exit the labor market is greater. (Butz and Ward 1979). Macunovich (1996) 
suggested that, at least in the United States, fertility remained ‘pro-cyclical’ as the 
negative effects of unemployment on fertility surpassed the ‘positive’ effects of the 
‘lower value’ of  time during the recession: “periods of high unemployment appear to 
have a stronger effect in disrupting a woman’s expectations regarding future income 
streams than they do in providing “windows of opportunity” for pregnancy” (p. 251). In 
Sweden, Andersson finds a similar pro-cyclical pattern (Andersson 2000). I consider the 
Andersson-Macunovich argument to be more persuasive, especially as rates of female 
unemployment also correlate strongly with male unemployment. In most countries two-
 adult couples (married or not) are still dominant, and the male losing his job will greatly 
increase the value of continued work for the women in that couple, canceling the effect of 
decreased time value in couples where only the woman lost her job.
formulate our first hypothesis:
  H1a: Unemployment has a negative impact on 
Figure 3.2: GDP and Fertility Rates in OECD
If the Myrskyla et al model of fertility rising with HDI in a J
correct, then at high levels of GDP (a strong correlate of HDI) we should expect higher 
fertility as well. OECD countries are much richer than the average country on earth, so 
we can expect that most of the countries in the study will have high incomes, placing 
them at the lip of the J-curve, as it were.
that there is indeed a positive link between per income and fertility, at least at the country 
level, which seems to go against the Butz
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-shaped curve is 
 A quick glance at the data in Figure 
-Ward hypothesis.  
 
3.2 suggests 
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H1b: Contrary to the worldwide trend where per capita GDP is negatively 
associated with TFR, among the subset of richer countries in the OECD group, 
higher GDP per capita should be associated with higher TFR.    
Given that the "price" of children is related to the opportunity cost for the 
woman's time, factor that affect how this time is valued are likely to impact on fertility as 
well. At the aggregate level it then makes sense to consider the rate of labor force 
participation (LFP) by women, since each woman in the labor force will have a higher 
opportunity cost. Academics are divided on even the sign of the causal relationship. The 
counter-argument is that the increase in income over the life-time of the parents due to 
female LFP more than outweighs the increased opportunity cost loss at the time of having 
a child, especially if childcare policies are structured such as to incentivize a quick return 
to the labor force.  (Lappegård 2000; Esping-Andersen 2009). In a recent study, 
Lappegård and Duvander find that the two-child family is highly compatible with the 
combination of work and family life, but that in families who choose to have more 
children, the mother often seems to have a weaker work orientation (Duvander, 
Lappegård et al. 2010).  
 Figure 3.3: Labor participation rate by women.
Even after removing Iceland as a strong outlier, the relationship remained strong. 
They conclude that while a high LFP might be compatible with a second child, LFP 
might hinder any further f
parametric loess regression of this factor on TFR. Iceland is a strong outlier and likely 
influences the results, but it is clear from the graph that LFP rates above 55% are 
associated with significantly higher fertility rates. In order to check whether this is an 
aberration of the data for the specific year chosen, I have performed the same test on the 
full dataset, with the results displayed in 
graph we see the traces left by high
as they are rapidly lowering their fertility rates.  
stable and shaped the same as before
levels above 55%. The concern about Iceland acting as a "magnet
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 Nonparametric fitting indicates a strong positive relationship. 
 
ertility. In Figure 3.3 I have displayed the results of a non
Figure 3.4 below. In the upper left part of the 
-fertility countries like Turkey, Ireland an
The nonparametric regression pattern is 
, with the loess curve again curving upward at LFP 
" is now compounded in 
 
-
d Azerbaijan 
 the time series observations, however. This highlights the need for a country
model in the combined predictor model, which I develop in Chapter 4. 
Figure 3.4: Labor Participation rate, female, all countries all years. 
The methodology in the Esping
quite solid, leading to the next hypothesis:
 
H1c: Among the sample OECD members, female labor force participation i
associated with higher TFR
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Figure 3.5: Tertiary Enrollment and Fertility. A nonparametric fittin
The remuneration a worker in the labor force will receive will depend 
skill-set, which she can increase through education.
members have near-universal basic literacy, the simple metric of literacy or even more 
elegant formulations like literate
discriminate between OECD members.
The situation is similar in terms 
only Turkey and Portugal lag significantly behind other OECD members. 
secondary school enrollment are thought to be
first fertility transition. Firs
resources rather than provide
higher the costs incurred by the parents
rational family will therefore
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The unspoken assumption is that the family will rationally examine the cost of educating 
children in the future and discount it to present value, adding it as a cost, before a 
decision is reached on having another child. Again, I must emphasize that I do not expect 
this to actually happen, but the model can capture parental heuristic calculus, where 
future costs are taken into account, if not as rigorously as the model might assume.  A 
quality-vs-quantity counter-argument was proposed by Kaplan et al., who use an 
evolutionary model to suggest a scenario whereby higher present costs are offset by the 
superior earning power of the children later in life giving the children ample opportunity 
to repay the extra parental investment in education (Kaplan and Lancaster 2003). This is 
disputed by Attias-Donfut et al. who conduct an empirical study and find that in Europe 
intergenerational financial transfers remain negative, with older adults continuing to 
transfer resources to their offspring even late in life, possibly in exchange for their 
children's time (Attias-Donfut, Ogg et al. 2005). A review of the literature on future 
educational costs of children does not provide a good way to decide on what the expected 
sign of the relationship between higher education and fertility would be (D'Addio 2005). 
Secondary education and tertiary education also contribute to lower fertility by another 
pathway, since by keeping girls in school, education delays the start of their reproductive 
lives for the majority, even though some sub-populations have remarkably high teenage 
pregnancy rates, especially in the United States. In her book The Incomplete Revolution, 
Gosta Esping-Andersen finds that at the individual level for Sweden, parental higher 
education is now positively associated with fertility  (Esping-Andersen 2009), which is 
the opposite of the relationship that had been prevalent for decades across the world, 
where more educated parents generally had fewer children. 
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 To summarize, the literature discusses three causal pathways by which education can 
directly affect fertility According to the first pathway, education makes children more 
costly for parents, but also much more productive. The causal relationship here is 
disputed. According to the second pathway, education decreases fertility simply by taking 
up time: a woman enrolled in secondary or tertiary education will generally try to avoid 
having children during her education. If tertiary education continues past a bachelor's 
degree, the reduction in the fertile window is significant. The problem with this argument 
is that since the total fertility rates in developed countries are relatively low (1-3 children 
per woman, far below the maximum theoretical number of children a woman can have 
across her life), it could be that education simply delays, rather than reduce, total fertility. 
Female higher education might simply be a costly signal (Arrow 1973; Bowen 1997). 
Sociologists have noted that marriage and cohabitation in recent decades have become 
ever-more segregated by socio-economic status and education, with most pairs formed 
within each group. Therefore, a woman seeking to attract a mate with higher education 
will find that acquiring a higher education is the best way to do so, regardless of her 
career/homemaker orientation. If we accept Hakim's heterogenous preferences model 
discussed at the start of the chapter, only 20% of women will strongly prefer being a 
home-maker (Hakim 2000). For the remaining 80% of women, it is unlikely that they will 
invest so much in education and then choose to remain outside the labor force for a 
considerable period. Education thus increases the future value of time, not only delaying 
births during the time taken up by education, but also increasing the opportunity cost of 
births after the end of education via labor force participation. See the section on female 
labor force participation for a discussion of the debated validity of that claim. If Esping-
 Andersen's (2009) finding
for the idea that higher time value for women increases fertility. 
effect would necessarily be indirect, going through higher labor force participation and 
higher earnings for women. 
Figure 3.6: Changing Patterns of Tertiary Education and Fertility: A quadratic 
higher explanatory power (R2=17%) than a linear model (F=56, R
There is no information on the future enrollment rate for children born today, but current 
values can serve as a proxy for that. In addition, if we choose 
enrollment, we can also account for the other two causal pathways.  
regression in Figure 3.5, the
regression is only marginally more edifying
weakly (R2<5%) co-varying higher education with OECD dataset
vulnerable to high-fertility low
relationship, shows better fit (R
Esping-Anderson model better. We can derive two models from this discussion:
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H1d: Among advanced industrial countries, there will be a positive relationship 
between high tertiary enrollment rates for women and fertility rates. 
H1e: The interaction of tertiary enrollment for women and female labor force 
participation should be positively associated with TFR.  
 With a causal mechanism on fertility that is very similar to one of those attributed 
to tertiary education, the age of first marriage for women has also been proposed as a 
predictor of lifetime fertility. In a previous chapter, I showed that Australian 
demographer J. C. Caldwell argued that delayed age of marriage was a driver of lower 
overall fertility before the advent of modern contraceptive technologies (Caldwell 1982). 
The mechanism here is again straightforward: to the extent that women tend to have 
children within the institution of marriage, a later onset of marriage reduces the number 
of fertile years during which she can potentially conceive. This is because without 
expensive assistive reproductive technology, a woman's reproductive fertility window is a 
lot shorter than her overall lifespan. According to biologists, for the average woman, 
fertility starts a slow decline around the age of 27, and the rate of decline increases 
greatly after 35 (Dunson, Colombo et al. 2002). In a rather surprising twist, a plot of the 
available data (Figure 3.7), fitted with a non-parametric loess curve suggests that at the 
country level, any further increase in the age of first marriage later than 26 is associated 
with a slight increase in TFR. This could be an artifact of the data -- countries with higher 
ages of first marriage might have some other characteristic that increases fertility. If our 
assumptions hold, it could mean that countries where women marry late see a "rush" of 
children in the last few years of fertility left to the late newlyweds. Alternatively, it could 
mean that one or more of our mechanism assumptions have failed. It could be, as it is 
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increasingly the case in Denmark, that women have children at older and older ages, with 
the help of reproductive technology (Schmidt 2006). Sobotka shows that " up to 7 percent 
of children of those native Danish women born in 1975 and later will likely be conceived 
by infertility treatment" (Sobotka, Hansen et al. 2008). Otherwise, the assumption that 
most of the children are born within the context of a married couple might have become 
invalid. If the married cohabitating family unit is no longer the main channel of 
 
Figure 3.7: Mean Age at First Marriage with a loess curve plot. 
reproduction, then at the very least, fertility might well become decoupled from the age 
of first marriage, aside from other social consequences of single parenthood.  
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Figure 3.8: Births to single mothers and Fertility 
Figure 3.8  helps confirm our earlier hypothesis that the family unit has lost its 
undisputed primacy as the institution most closely associated with reproduction.   Figure 
3.9 shows that out-of-wedlock births have increased almost without exception throughout 
our sample in the past 30 years. Only Cyprus, Greece, Japan, Korea and Turkey have 
illegitimacy rates below 15% in our sample, while Bulgaria, Estonia, France, Iceland, 
Norway, Slovenia and Sweden see over 50% of births happen outside of marriage. It 
seems that women across the developed world have found themselves trading the security 
of marriage for cohabitation or single motherhood. Finally, in Figure 3.10, we see that as 
the mean age at first marriage has risen, so have the out-of-wedlock births. We can 
conclude that at least part of the increased fertility with delayed age of marriage is 
explained by the higher rate of births outside marriage.  
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Figure 3.9: Births Outside of Marriage by Country and Year. Data are missing for Hong Kong and Albania, while 
Korea, Japan and Turkey have rates of illegitimacy <1% and are not visible on the plot. The dotted line at 23% is the 
30 year sample mean. 
 
Figure 3.10: A high Mean Age at First Marriage is strongly associated with high single motherhood rates. 
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H1f: A later mean age at first marriage should result in a decreased fertility 
rate. 
H1g: A higher rate of children born out of wedlock as a percentage of the 
total number of children should be associated with a higher fertility rate.  
 
Urbanization is part and parcel of the ongoing modernization process. Fleeing 
what Marx once called the "idiocy of rural life" people have been flocking to the cities in 
their millions. The impact on fertility, while probably indirect, has been clear: urban areas 
have historically had a  lower fertility than rural areas as women in cities study longer 
and marry later than their rural cousins (Sharlin 1980; Watkins 1987). More directly, 
urbanization leads to a relative increase in the price of living space, while rearing 
children is far easier when living space is more abundant. This makes the relative cost of 
children rise with each increment in the price of housing (Heer 1968). Both mechanisms 
point in the same direction, leading us to expect higher urbanization to result in lower 
fertility.  The empirical data in Figure 3.11 supports this claim, illustrating the transition 
from a world of mostly high fertility and low urbanization, to a high urbanization, low 
fertility world. Within the developed-world context of our 30 year sample (Figure 3.12), 
we find the same negative relationship, if somewhat attenuated, because most of the 
sample had already completed the first fertility transition. A multivariate analysis should 
help establish the direct effect of urbanization, rather than via higher literacy and delayed 
marriage. 
H1h: Increased urbanization will have a detrimental effect on TFR. 
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Figure 3.11: A dual snapshot of urbanization and fertility across the entire world: 1960 (squares) and 2009 
(triangles). Computed using World Bank Data. 
 
Figure 3.12: TFR and Urbanization within the sample. In the scatterplot, the negative relationship holds across 
the time series, with both a linear estimator and a loess nonparametric regression in agreement.   
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Finally, from within the rational-economic context we have been using, it is 
rational to insure against uncertainty. The idea behind using infant mortality as a 
predictor is that higher fertility can serve as insurance in a high mortality context: by 
having more children, the parents increase the likelihood that enough of them will survive 
to adulthood. But does the theory apply in the post-fertility-transition context as well? 
Using Israeli microdata Ben-Porath finds that "experienced mortality reduces the 
probability of stopping at a given  birth  (i.e.,  raises  the  number  of  births)  and  reduces  
the  intervals between  births" (Ben-Porath 1976) . The relationship was confirmed by 
Chowdhury with using cross national comparisons (Chowdhury 1988; Cigno 1998). 
However, Doepke finds that even with declining infant mortality and declining fertility 
the number of surviving children can increase (Doepke 2005), concluding that declining 
child mortality cannot account for the decline in net reproduction rates in industrialized 
countries.  The cross-national data show a positive relationship between fertility and 
infant-mortality, even in the low-mortality context of the OECD. However, the data is 
strongly concentrated around very low mortality and the slope is therefore mostly 
influenced by several high-mortality outliers.  
Restricting the analysis to a snapshot of the latest data, as in Figure 3.14 below, 
suggests that, within the low-mortality context of the industrialized countries in the 
sample, it is actually the ones with the lowest mortality that show the highest fertility 
rates. A loess regression confirms this trend, before climbing back up to meet the two 
(relatively) high mortality outliers, Georgia, Moldova and Armenia. There is no known 
mechanism in the literature by which lowest-low mortality would directly influence 
 fertility positively, so this result is probably due to correlations between low mortality 
and other measures. 
Figure 3.13: Infant mortality and Fertility, whole dataset.
Lowest of the low infant mortality is strongly associated with a stellar health
system, and health care outcomes are part of the definition HDI
expectancy component. Infant mortality is probably not a strong predictor of fertility 
among industrialized nations. 
Figure 3.14: Infant mortality and 
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Public policies  
 
 Public policies have an undeniable impact on families and fertility decisions. 
Among other things, they regulate the conditions of employment, define eligibility to 
welfare and childcare subsidies, provide education and health services, and set out the 
rights and responsibilities of parents. Curiously for a spending program involving billions 
of USD per annum, the effect of government spending in support of families is unclear. 
Our rational-decision model discussed earlier would suggest that each marginal decrease 
in the cost of having children should result in a marginal increase in the number of 
children born. This simple analysis is complicated somewhat by the fact that the money 
to pay for childcare policies and other pro-family measures must come from the 
taxpayers, perhaps a case of robbing the right hand to pay the left hand. It is not even 
clear that the spending is actually effective. Gauthier and Hatzius conduct an econometric 
survey of 22 industrialized countries between 1970-1990 and conclude that "cash benefits 
in the form of family allowances are positively related to fertility" but nonetheless "the 
effects of policy appear to be small". Gauthier and Hatzius quantify the impact of 
increases in family payments as being 0.07 of a child for a 25% increase in expenditure 
(Gauthier and Hatzius 1997). Castles uses OECD data from 20 nations for a single year 
and finds a positive relationship between spending and fertility (Castles 2003). In a study 
of the effect of cash benefits for children introduced in Norway in 1998, Aassve finds a 
strong positive effect, most pronounced among conservative households (Aassve and 
Lappegård 2009). However, other studies using macro-level data have concluded that the 
impact of policies on fertility is most likely on the timing of births rather than on the total 
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number of children (Gauthier 2007). Since governments are not often in the business of 
running controlled experiments, many of these policies do not have a counterfactual 
(what would have happened in the absence of the policy) so assessing policy 
effectiveness is difficult. McDonald argues that government policy can be effective, but 
only if it is "correctly" apportioned, providing plenty of policy suggestions but relatively 
little in the way of concrete evidence to augment his claims (McDonald 2006). 
 
Figure 3.15: Spending on families. A linear trend on the scatterplot suggests no effect. The Loess estimator 
recovers a positive trend at expenditure levels above 1% of GDP.  
As discussed earlier in the chapter, I use a measure of total government spending for 
families, calculated as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product. This measure does not 
include the value of tax credits, and will therefore underestimate the amount of 
government assistance in countries like the U.S. that rely heavily on tax credits. On the 
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positive side, the estimate will therefore be an underestimate of the true effect, so the 
only net effect of this omission is to make a successful test all the more significant. The 
simple linear trend calculation illustrated in Figure 3.15 suggests that there is no 
relationship between spending levels and fertility scores - a horizontal line with R2=0. 
The high-fertility outliers (quickly undergoing the final stages of the first fertility 
transition) are charted on the top left on the graph and are influential points, skewing the 
linear result. The loess nonparametric estimator does not have the same sensitivity, and 
outside the range of the outliers, it indeed detects a positive fertility trend at GDP 
spending levels above 1%. 
H2a: Social spending on families by the Government is associated with higher 
rates of fertility. 
Government policy can also have an effect via the regulatory framework over labor. 
By allowing and encouraging different norms, governments can have a powerful effect 
over how workers and their employers interact. Unfortunately, cross-national time series 
are not available for work schedule flexibility, a measure of what percentage of the 
female workforce have some freedom in deciding their work schedules on a regular basis. 
The intuition here is that a young mother will find it a lot easier to juggle parental 
responsibilities and a career if she has the ability to alter her work schedule to suit her 
needs. I chose to focus on the female side of the labor force because for now, despite 
increased male contributions at home, women remain the primary caretakers. Using 
OECD data for 2007, I show a positive relationship between labor force flexibility for 
women and TFR.  
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The positive relationship in Figure 3.16 is what we would expect, given the 
assumptions of our rational decision making model -  as Hill et al. argue, job flexibility 
should make it easier for women to be employed, increasing their net income and 
decreasing the cost of children (Hill, Hawkins et al. 2001). In contrast, using survey data  
from 11 countries, Ariza found a positive relationship only in half,  and a negative 
relationship in the other 6 countries  (Ariza, de la Rica et al. 2005), suggesting that some 
cultural or institutional factor might be at work. In the absence of better data, this will 
remain at the level of speculation.  
 
Figure 3.16: Flexible schedules seem to boost fertility, but data is sparse 
One year's worth of data cannot yield useful estimates in a time series analysis, but as 
mentioned earlier, no one has made available a cross-national time-series dataset about 
flexible labor practices. Instead, I have decided to use a less powerful proxy of labor 
flexibility, part time employment. It is tempting to assume that part-time work and job 
flexibility are two very similar measurements, and to a significant extent, this is true. If 
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the physical and mental effort of childrearing leave the mother willing to be in the 
workforce, but unable to put in a full 40 hours a week, a part time job can make all the 
difference. As a measure of labor market flexibility, part time employment could help 
increase fertility by allowing mothers to balance a childcare and a job (Del Boca 2002), 
although Engelhardt finds no such relationship (Engelhardt and Prskawetz 2004). 
Ceteris paribus, a society where it is easy to form part time job arrangements should see 
an increase in TFR. The proxy I use (women employed in part time jobs as a percentage 
of total jobs for women) does not measure the ease with which such arrangements can be 
created, but their prevalence in the work force.  
 This means that aside from mothers seeking part time work, several other data-
generating sources may be contributing to the observed share of part time jobs available. 
From the supply side, employers might be unwilling to hire anyone full-time because the 
macroeconomic situation might be difficult, because restrictions on hiring and firing 
regular workers are too strict, or because the conditions during employment are too 
onerous for the firm to maintain its desired level of profitability. From the demand side, a 
high proportion of part-time employment could be a sign of income insecurity (unable to 
find a full-time position, the person chose a part-time position rather than be 
unemployed). Both probably take place to some degree, and this will contaminate our 
results. In theory, this problem could be mitigated by simply subtracting involuntary part-
time employment from the part-time rolls, but the set of assumptions undergirding the 
definition of involuntary part-time work are rather heroic, and it would still leave the 
possible supply side contamination in place.  
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Figure 3.17: Part Time Employment: Total (top) and Female (bottom) 
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 Can the measure still be trusted? Luckily, both potential contaminants work 
against the mechanism of part time maternal employment described earlier. People are 
more likely to try to have children when they have financial reserves, rather than when 
they are drawing on them (Kravdal 1994), so job insecurity (the demand side 
contaminant) would be a negative influence. Similarly, a restrictive labor market (the 
supply side contaminant) with high barrier to enter and exit the workforce, will greatly 
increase the opportunity costs of having children. Both contaminants therefore are likely 
to dampen the effect, making the significance test harder to pass. Therefore, a significant 
result would be significant despite the potential contaminants. 
 
H2b:  Increased prevalence of female part time employment has a positive effect on 
TFR 
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Cultural Measures 
 
All of the variables in this section are actual questions from the World Values Survey and 
the European Values Study, or aggregate measures derived from such.  
  
 
Figure 3.18: Traditional dimension and fertility, OECD countries 
 
 As mentioned earlier, WVS data has been used previously in the context of 
fertility by Feyrer, who used several questions regarding attitudes towards abortion and 
the survey responder's realized number of children as part of an individual level analysis 
(Feyrer, Sacerdote et al. 2007). Without focusing on the issue in detail, Inglehart 
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observed that "people in traditional societies idealize large families, and they actually 
have them. High scores on the traditional dimension are strongly correlated with high 
fertility rates" (Inglehart and Baker 2000). The relationship is graphically illustrated in 
the OECD data in Figure 3.18 above, showing fertility decreasing as traditional values are 
replaced by rational-secular ones. The causal pathway is rather straightforward. Increased 
Rational-Secular values lead to decreased levels of community and family ties. Since 
families and deep support networks have traditionally been the primary supporting 
institutions behind child-rearing, a weakening of these ties should lead to decreased TFR. 
Similarly, the move away from traditional values also results in detachment from formal 
religious worship. Churches have historically sought to boost the fertility of their 
adherents, as a way to maintain or even boost their membership. In the past, a strong 
selection effect has acted in favor of churches capable of boosting the fertility of their 
flock and retain members born within their ranks. To this day, the Catholic church frowns 
upon birth control, although few adherents now pay heed to these admonitions, and most 
churches (Christian or otherwise) reject the use of abortion as a means of birth control, 
with more traditional churches opposing the practice more vehemently. Churches can 
also provide non-material (spiritual) compensators that for believers help defray the 
opportunity costs in foregone personal consumption that arise when having children. 
Finally, church communities can provide support networks for new parents, with advice, 
baby-sitting and parent activities. 
 
H3a: Higher Traditional/Rational scores will be associated with lower levels of 
fertility.  
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 The Traditional/Secular dimension already includes data on attitudes towards 
abortion, but nonetheless I have included the data here because it has been used in the 
literature before and it has a direct impact on fertility rates. The high correlation with the 
Traditional dimension, it will not be in the final analysis, but the OECD data presented a 
surprising inversion. The survey respondents were asked to rate the justifiability of 
abortion on a ten point scale, with options ranging from 1 (Never justifiable) to 10 
(Always justifiable). In Figure 3.19, OECD countries with more liberal attitudes towards 
the justifiability of abortion actually display higher fertility rates than most of those who 
have negative views on the topic (with the exception of Ireland).  
 A similar pattern emerged when examining attitudes towards the justifiability of 
divorce (Figure 3.20). Countries that show a more liberal attitude towards divorce (scores 
over 5) show consistently higher levels of fertility than those with lower scores.  
 
 Figure 3.19: Survey responses on the acceptability of abortion and fertility. Higher nu
permissive attitude towards abortion. Among OECD countries, fertility is actually higher among publics tha
more permissive.  
Figure 3.20: Attitudes towards divorce and fertility 
more permissive attitude towards divorce. 
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.   
Figure 3.21: Survival/Self-expression in the OECD time-series. Higher S/SE values are linked to higher fertility. 
The traditional/rational measure has seen previous use in the context of TFR. 
Inglehart and Norris, during their discussion of the consequences of secularism, mention 
a strong and significant negative relationship between high secular/rational values and the 
measures of fertility (Inglehart and Norris 2004). The relationship between the second 
cultural dimension (the survival/self-expression projection) and TFR is not explored in 
depth, but it is implied to also be negative. As societies shift from being survival oriented 
toward being self-expression oriented, the individuals living in these societies experience 
a profound transformation. In societies focused on survival, children are seen as the 
primary means of old age support and thus vital, whereas in the latter children are seen as 
a self-expressive choice (van de Kaa 2002).  
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 Women need children to be 
fulfilled 
When jobs are 
scarce, men should 
have priority 
Women 15-35 39% 12% 
Women 35-50 45% 19% 
Table 3.1: Attitudes toward children and marriage, average of entire datasample for latest available period. 
Compiled from WVS data. 
 In Table 3.1 I present the results of two questions asked in a recent WVS survey. I 
have separated and aggregated the responses for two subgroups, women between 15 and 
35 and women aged 35 to 50, and restricted only to those countries in the current survey 
(mostly OECD). The first question asked the respondents whether they think women 
must have children in order to be fulfilled. Within the 15-35 age group, 39% answered 
yes, and within the 35-50 group, 45% answered yes. A majority of women from the 
OECD space do not think children are a necessary condition for self-fulfillment. The 
second question asked the respondents if they agreed with the statement "When jobs are 
scarce, men should have more right to a job than women." Only 12% and 19% among 15-
35 and 35-50 respectively answered in the positive, indicating widespread support female 
wage-earning employment.  
In light of these findings, should we then expect the relationship between 
Survival/Self-expression values and TFR to be negative? Nothing is ever so simple: being 
a mother can be very fulfilling, and as gender-based wage inequality decreases and glass 
ceilings are shattered, balancing childbearing and a successful career is not outside the 
realm of possibility. At the level of the entire world, the correlation between TFR and 
Self-Expression values is strongly negative, but is it possible that high enough Self-
expression values might actually nudge women towards having another child? A famous 
example of such a shift is the relationship between fertility and scores on the Human 
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Development Index (HDI is an aggregate measure of education, life expectancy and 
income). As late as 1996, Bongaarts and Watkins declared that "there is a highly 
significant negative correlation between HDI and fertility  (R2 = 0.6)" (Bongaarts and 
Watkins 1996). Thirteen years later,  Myrskyla et al. revealed that the relationship turned 
non-linear after a certain critical level (HDI = 0.86) was passed (Myrskylä, Kohler et al. 
2009). They were quick to draw the link to the population decline issue: "our ﬁndings 
reduce, if not yet completely reject, fears of population decline that have been 
incorporated in many national population forecasts for highly advanced countries." (8) 
This claim ignored the fact that Japan, one of the biggest gainers on the HDI scale over 
the interval Myrskla studies, continued its fertility decline, and that most high HDI 
countries made only negligible gains in fertility.   
 
Figure 3.22 HDI and TFR, from Myrskyla et al. By 2005, high HDI became associated with moderately higher 
TFR. 
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While some high HDI countries experienced a moderate recovery, others did not. It is 
likely that some other variable, that correlates in some way with HDI, is playing a role 
here. We know that HDI and Survival/Self-Expression share a relatively strong 
correlation. (Inglehart and Norris 2003). This lends plausibility to the possibility that the 
relationship between Survival/Self-Expression and TFR is also J-shaped, with a positive 
relationship for higher values. The literature is silent on the subject, and to my knowledge 
the WVS value dimensions have never been used in relation to fertility outside of the 
brief mention in the context of religious-secular contrasts in Sacred and Secular (23-26 
and 235-239), and never as year-on-year panel data.   
We thus have no past theoretical work on the topic to rely on, and two competing causal 
stories, one suggesting a strictly negative relationship between Survival/Self-Expression 
values and TFR, the other suggesting that the relationship might become positive at high 
levels of Self-Expression following an J-shaped curve akin to HDI and fertility. I will 
rely on empirical testing to reject or accept these hypotheses. 
H3b: Along the Survival/Self-expression cultural axis, increasing Self-Expression 
values are negatively related to TFR levels.  
H3c: Above a certain threshold value, the relationship between Survival/Self-
Expression values and TFR becomes positive, while the relationship is negative 
below it.  
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Chapter 4 
Chapter 4 Empirical Analysis 
 
 
Structure of the Dataset 
 
The data for this empirical analysis covers 45 countries over the period from 1980 to 
2009. The data sources are diverse. I rely primarily on United Nations (UNdata, UNICEF 
TransMONEE and ILO Laborstats), World Bank (the massive WDI-GDF dataset), 
OECD (iLibrary SOCEX) and Eurostat data but I have also made use of various national 
statistics databases to fill out missing information where possible. The cultural indicators 
are derived from the six World Values Survey waves, with matching questions from the 
European Values Study surveys added in. The WVS are carried out on average once 
every four years in each country, but in some instances due to WVS-EVS overlap, two 
surveys of the same country are only a year apart. Aside from Hong Kong, which was 
only covered once in 2005, all other countries have been repeatedly surveyed, with at 
least 3 surveys in each country. Examination of the data reveals a high level of 
consistently linear trends among repeated surveys in each country, without massive 
jumps from year to year (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Since most of the countries have 
five or more surveys available at this point, the average gap between two surveys is only 
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4 years, making linear imputation of missing years between WVS surveys in those cases 
relatively unproblematic. 
Descriptive Statistics  
 
Valid 
N 
Minim
um 
Maxim
um Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Data Source 
Fertility rate, total (births 
per woman) 
1308 .90 4.19 1.752 .4409 United Nations (UNdata) 
Survival/Self-Expression 895 -1.22 1.48 .1424 .64976 WVS, computed index 
Traditional/Rational 
Secular 
895 -.9 1.2 .332 .4650 WVS, computed index 
Govt. Family Assist. 
%GDP 
669 .01 4.85 1.8407 1.03563 OECD iLibrary, SOCEX 
School enrollment, 
tertiary, female (% gross) 
1113 2.32 108.59 43.029
1 
24.47455 World Bank, WDI/GDF 
Labor participation rate, 
female (% of female 
population ages 15+) 
1350 24.0 75.6 51.600 8.7376 World Bank WDI/GDF 
Part time employment, 
female (% of total female 
employment) 
722 .6 60.7 21.916 13.0186 UN ILO Labor Statistics 
Database 
GDP per Capita at PPP, 
constant 2005 USD 
1237 1303 49070 18891 10473 World Bank WDI/GDF 
Urbanization 1400 33.8 100 67.61 13.79 World Bank, WDI/GDF 
Children Born outside of 
Marriage 
1001 0.25 65.72 23.87 16.183 Eurostat, Various National 
Statistics 
Mean Age at First 
Marriage 
1094 21.10 32.5 25.49 2.615 Eurostat, Various National 
Statistics 
Unemployment, total (% 
of total labor force) 
949 .60 36.41 8.1315 4.62297 UN ILO Labor Statistics 
Database 
Valid N (listwise) 443      
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics of the Dataset 
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Table 4.2: Correlation Matrix 
The correlation matrix in Table 4.2 has been color-coded to indicate high correlation 
levels, both positive and negative. Using variables with high correlation levels in the 
same regression analysis will introduce problems of collinearity into the error terms, and 
if the correlations are high enough, create super-influential outliers that can skew the 
coefficient estimates. The average correlation level is 0.24, and the level of correlation 
between the independent variables is worryingly high.  
To assess the danger to the model, I use an R implementation of the regression 
collinearity diagnostic procedures found in Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch (Belsley, Kuh et al. 
1980). These procedures examine the “conditioning” of the matrix of independent 
variables. The analysis computes the condition indexes of the matrix. If the largest 
condition index (the condition number) is large (Belsley et al. suggest 30 or higher), then 
there may be collinearity problems. All large condition indexes may be worth 
investigating. The variance decomposition proportions associated with each condition 
index provide further information that may help to identify the source of these problems. 
If a large condition index is associated two or more variables with large variance 
Fertil FamSpend GDPppp Marry1st BirthOutW LFP EducFemTer Urban Unempl PartTime TradRat SurvSelf
Fertil 0.32 0.39 0.28 0.46 0.42 0.14 0.32 -0.25 0.40 -0.26 0.54
GDPSpendFam 0.32 0.17 0.48 0.65 0.42 0.11 0.31 -0.29 0.15 0.53 0.39
GDPppp 0.39 0.17 0.57 0.36 0.44 0.50 0.40 -0.60 0.63 0.10 0.74
MeanFirstMarr 0.28 0.48 0.57 0.54 0.37 0.43 0.33 -0.36 0.48 0.29 0.61
BirthOutWed 0.46 0.65 0.36 0.54 0.75 0.47 0.36 -0.44 0.21 0.35 0.46
LFP 0.42 0.42 0.44 0.37 0.75 0.36 0.32 -0.58 0.39 0.30 0.57
EducFemTer 0.14 0.11 0.50 0.43 0.47 0.36 0.06 -0.23 0.03 0.02 0.28
Urban 0.32 0.31 0.40 0.33 0.36 0.32 0.06 -0.27 0.48 0.20 0.53
Unempl -0.25 -0.29 -0.60 -0.36 -0.44 -0.58 -0.23 -0.27 -0.48 -0.28 -0.46
PartTime 0.40 0.15 0.63 0.48 0.21 0.39 0.03 0.48 -0.48 0.07 0.68
TradRat -0.26 0.53 0.10 0.29 0.35 0.30 0.02 0.20 -0.28 0.07 0.20
SurvSelf 0.54 0.39 0.74 0.61 0.46 0.57 0.28 0.53 -0.46 0.68 0.20
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decomposition proportions, these variables may be causing collinearity problems. Belsley 
et al suggest that a large proportion is 50 percent or more. 
 
Table 4.3: : Tableplot of the 11 detected condition indices and variance proportions for the regression data. In 
column 1, the symbols are scaled relative to a maximum condition index of 30. In the remaining columns, variance 
proportions (×100) are scaled relative to a maximum of 100. 
Table 4.3 above displays the result of the regression collinearity diagnostic. 11 
condition indices were calculated, and their values are displayed in the first column. All 
the indices have values below 30, which is reassuring for the integrity of the model. 
However, for three of the indices, there are variance proportions above 50%. From the 
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condition index 11, it appears that the combination of GDP per capita, Births outside of 
wedlock, Female labor force participation and Survival/Self-Expression in the same 
model will cause collinearity problems.  Condition index 10 warns that the combination 
of GDP per capita, Births outside of wedlock, and Tertiary female education in the same 
model can also be a source of collinearity. Finally, in condition index 9, we can deduce 
that the combination of Female part time employment, Female Tertiary Education, Mean 
age at first birth and Government Spending on Families as % of GDP can also cause 
multicollinearity problems. This analysis shows that we cannot run a simultaneous model 
of all variables, but will have to test them in two batches instead to avoid crippling 
collinearity problems.   
 
Analysis 
 
 
Perhaps the simplest question we can ask when looking at the data is whether there 
actually is significant variation in the variable 
of interest, in our case, total fertility rates. 
The question is pertinent, especially since I 
have restricted the dataset to comprise mostly 
OECD and a few other industrialized 
European nations. In accordance with the 
First Demographic Transition theory, all of 
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Figure 4.1: Countries still completing 1st Fertility 
Transition 
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these states have seen reduced mortality, and have also completed the transition towards 
reduced fertility from the levels seen in pre-industrial agrarian countries (or in the case of 
Albania, Azerbaijan and Ireland and Turkey were in the process of doing so, as can be 
seen in Figure 4.1). The theory does not specify a higher or lower threshold, nor does it 
tell us whether we should expect all countries to converge to a specific value, although 
the ex-ante general expectation among demographers was that there would be a 
convergence around replacement (2.1) TFR (Lesthaeghe 1995).  
We can model the relationship thus: 
      	  
      
    ( 4.1 
 
where is the observed fertility rate for country i at time t,  is the mean fertility rate 
across the entire population in the sample, and  are independent   error terms. 
The number of countries is n=45 and the number of observations for each country is  
with a maximum span of 31 years (1980-2010). Because of data gaps, we have an 
unbalanced panel, so some countries may have more valid observations than others. The 
total number of observations for the current model is    

  
. 
Fitting this first simple model in the R statistical package, I find   
 and  
  . This indicates that significant variation does exist within the dataset. Looking 
back at Table 4.1 we can see that the numbers are indeed the mean and standard deviation 
of the fertility rate variable. Figure 4.2 below shows the residual plots for each country 
across the 30 year time horizon. More than half of the countries have residuals 
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significantly different from 0. This suggests the next step in the analysis: fixed country 
effects. 
  
 
Figure 4.2: Residual plots for means only model 
The country effects indicated in Figure 4.2 may be incorporated into a model for TFR by 
allowing each country to be represented by a separate parameter. This fixed-effects model for 
one-way classification can be described by the formula: 
      	  
      
    ( 4.2 
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where  represents the mean fertility rate in country i, and as in ( 4.1 above  is the 
normally distributed error term. The parameter estimates are given in the Appendix. The 
residual standard error for this model is 0.303. Accounting for country level fixed effects 
explains only 30% or so of the observed variation in the data.  
 
Figure 4.3: Residual plots for Fixed Country Effects 
We can perform a similar test to check for across-countries time variation, using a 
simple least squares model: 
   !  "   	  
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     
    ( 4.3 
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where ! is an intercept, " is a fixed coefficient for time effects. Estimating the model I 
obtain !#  $%, "#  &$
% and a   %. The residual error is high compared 
to the TFR sample average (0.44) suggesting that a time efffect cannot account for more 
than 11% of the variation in the dataset.  
A combination of the least square model for time and fixed effects for the country 
   !    "   	  
      
    ( 4.4 
 
yields !#  $%%, "#  &$$ and a   $, with an F-statistic of 79.8 which 
means that this simple but powerful model explains about half of the variation not 
accounted for in the initial mean model. 
Other variables must account for the remainder of the variation. Ideally, we would 
like to estimate a model with data grouped by country, and generate estimators for all the 
other covariates within each country. These would take the shape: 
   '(  )*+*     
    ,- .
- / 
( 4.5 
 where   
    are observations within each country, ( is the p-dimensional fixed 
effects (where p is the number of covariates in the model), Z is the matrix of random 
effect variables, . is the variance-covariance matrix for the random effects, and is the 
variation in the error term. However, with a maximum of only 30 (and frequently fewer) 
observations per country, the reliability of any but the simplest estimators is highly 
doubtful. We must use a simpler indicator. 
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Figure 4.4:  
Instead, I start from from the general panel model: 
   0  (12  3 ( 4.6 
 
Recognizing that  3 cannot be estimated with NxT datapoints, I will make a number 
of parameter homogeneity assumptions.  0  0 4	  and     4	 . To model 
country level heterogeneity, we can split the error term 3 into two parts, one country-
specific which I will assume is invariant across t, 5 while the second is the remaining 
noise term  with a standard normal distribution, with  6 2 7  6 5:  
   0  (82  5   ( 4.7 
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which is a fixed effects model where 0, 5 and the ( must be estimated. If 5 is assumed 
to be 0, we have a pooling model.  
 
The assumptions that we must accept in order to perform this estimations are rather 
strong, so let us evaluate another possibility, first-differencing the data: 
 9  0  (892  5  9 ( 4.8 
where t=2,...T.   
Lastly, the between model, which is computed on time (group) averages of the data, 
discardsall the information due to intragroup variability but is consistent in some settings 
(e.g., non-stationarity) where the others are not, and is often preferred to estimate long-
run relationships.  
For the calculating the estimators, I use a version of the plm package (Croissant and 
Millo 2008).  Due to the collinearity complications discussed at the start of this chapter, I 
calculate have split the determinants into two set of estimators, to be calculated 
separately. 
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Table 4.4: Main between country estimation table. 
 
Table 4.5: Beta estimators for the Fixed Effects and a Pooling model.  Adj. R-Squared =  0.55268  F-statistic: 
92.9001 on 8 and 581 DF, p-value: < 2.22e-16. In the first model the "Country" variable is treated as a fixed effect, 
in the second the effects are pooled (assume to be equal for all countries) 
 
"Between" Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 7.7350 3.2028 2.4151 0.0254
SurvSelf 0.4597 0.2153 2.1354 0.0453
GDPSpendFam 0.0476 0.0655 0.7272 0.4755
TradRat -0.3309 0.1340 -2.4698 0.0226
lnGDP -1.3275 0.7146 -1.8576 0.0780
LFP -0.0042 0.0084 -0.5025 0.6208
EducFemTer -0.0006 0.0037 -0.1675 0.8687
Unempl -0.0321 0.0190 -1.6902 0.1065
R^2=48.9%
"Within" Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)
SurvSelf -0.0987 0.0575 -1.7165 0.0866
TradRat -0.2956 0.0598 -4.9456 0.0000
EducFemTer -0.0176 0.0019 -9.3539 0.0000
BirthOutWed 0.0021 0.0016 1.2797 0.2012
Unempl -0.0068 0.0023 -3.0209 0.0026
MeanFirstMarr -0.0098 0.0118 -0.8240 0.4103
EducFemTer:LFP 0.0003 0.0000 9.6509 0.0000
R-sq= 0.39, F=52.6, p-value: < 2.22e-16
"Pooling" Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 1.6783 0.1354 12.3978 0.0000
SurvSelf 0.1866 0.0217 8.5927 0.0000
TradRat -0.2618 0.0183 -14.3265 0.0000
EducFemTer -0.0141 0.0015 -9.6508 0.0000
BirthOutWed 0.0036 0.0007 4.8254 0.0000
Unempl -0.0022 0.0020 -1.0668 0.2865
MeanFirstMarr 0.0016 0.0056 0.2846 0.7761
EducFemTer:LFP 0.0002 0.0000 7.7491 0.0000
R-sq=0.53, F= 99.5, p-value  < 2.22e-16
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Table 4.6: Country Fixed Effects Estimates for the "Within" Fixed Effects model 
In Table 4.5, I present two sets of   estimators using the  two different methods 
discussed above. The Table 4.6 lists the 5:;  for the "within" fixed effects estimator. I have 
added the information for the pooling estimator to illustrate the pitfalls of not taking into 
account fixed country effects. As shown above, the "pooling" estimator assumes that all 
country-fixed effects are equal (can be pooled). This results in severe model 
misspecification. I test for this using an F-test for individual (in our case country level) 
effects, with F = 24.59, df1 = 38, df2 = 544, p-value < 2.2e-16, where H0: There are no 
significant effects, The p-value leads us to reject the null, and indicates that country-level 
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Iceland Ireland Italy
2.16 2.42 1.97
Japan Korea Latvia
2.19 1.88 1.75
Lithuania Moldova Netherlands
1.85 1.83 2.25
Norway Poland Portugal
2.30 1.78 1.72
Romania Slovakia Slovenia
1.52 1.81 1.83
Spain Sweden Switzerland
2.05 2.34 1.92
Ukraine United Kingdom United States
1.70 2.20 2.12
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effects are highly significant. Checking against the Fixed effects table, we find a lot of 
variation, from over 2.5 to about 1.5, with the standard deviation at 0.25. The choice 
between fixed and random effects2  specifications is based on Hausman-type tests, 
comparing the two estimators under the null of no significant difference: if this is not 
rejected, the more efficient random effects estimator is chosen. With chisq = 22.9099, df 
= 7, p-value = 0.001767, the null is rejected, and a fixed effects model is prefered. 
How did the hypotheses from Chapter 3 fare under the fixed effects model? 
 
 
                                                          
2 I did not include the random effects model in the paper but I calculated the estimates 
and rejected it after a Hausman test. For more information see source code in Appendix 
Hypothesis Statement of hypothesis Test Result
H1a
Unemployment has a negative impact on TFR.
Confirmed at 
p=1%
H1d Among advanced industrial countries, there will be a positive 
relationship between high tertiary enrollment rates for women 
and fertility rates.
Rejected at 
0.01%
H1e The interaction of tertiary enrollment for women and female 
labor force participation should be positively associated with 
TFR. 
Confirmed at 
p=1%
H1f A later mean age at first marriage should result in a decreased 
fertility rate. Not significant
H1g A higher rate of children born out of wedlock as a percentage of 
the total number of children Not significant
H3a Higher Traditional/Rational scores will be associated with 
lower levels of fertility. 
Confirmed at 
p=1%
H3b
Along the Survival/Self-expression cultural axis, increasing 
Self-Expression values are negatively related to TFR levels.
Confirmed at 
p=10%, not 
significant at 
5%
H3c Above a certain threshold value, the relationship between 
Survival/Self-Expression values and TFR becomes positive, 
while the relationship is negative below it. 
Rejected at 
5%
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Table 4.7: Estimates for country fixed effects, model 2 
Again, I test whether a fixed effects model is the most appropriate specification using 
an F test for individual effects. The results (F = 101.9901, df1 = 27, df2 = 421, p-value < 
2.2e-16) allow us to again reject a pooling model as miss-specified (in effect a pooling 
model is similar on an ordinary least squares model)  
 
Table 4.8: Estimators for second regression 
 
Australia Austria Belgium Canada
2.13 1.45 2.29 1.68
Czech Denmark Estonia Finland
0.94 1.71 1.06 1.30
France Germany Greece Hungary
1.92 1.51 1.23 1.01
Iceland Ireland Italy Japan
1.94 2.25 1.69 1.58
Netherlands Norway Poland Portugal
2.31 2.05 1.04 1.06
Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden
0.68 0.69 1.58 1.72
Switzerland Turkey UK USA
1.81 2.85 2.21 2.02
"Within" Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)
GDPSpendFam 0.0341 0.0206 1.6578 0.0980
FPartTime -0.0073 0.0022 -3.3999 0.0007
LFP 0.0230 0.0032 7.2326 0.0000
Urban -0.0064 0.0042 -1.5325 0.1261
lnGDP -1.0924 0.1374 -7.9474 0.0000
GDPSpendFam:SurvSelf 0.0457 0.0201 2.2752 0.0234
R-sq=.20, F=18.2 p<0.00001
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Hypothesis Statement of hypothesis Test Result
H1a
Unemployment has a negative impact on TFR.
Confirmed at 
p=1%
H1b Contrary to the worldwide trend where per capita GDP is 
negatively associated with TFR, among the subset of richer 
countries in the OECD group, higher GDP per capita should be 
associated with higher TFR.   
Rejected at 
0.001%
H1c Among the sample OECD members, female labor force 
participation is associated with higher TFR.
Significant at 
0.001%
H1d Among advanced industrial countries, there will be a positive 
relationship between high tertiary enrollment rates for women 
and fertility rates.
Rejected at 
0.01%
H1e The interaction of tertiary enrollment for women and female 
labor force participation should be positively associated with 
TFR. 
Confirmed at 
p=1%
H1f A later mean age at first marriage should result in a decreased 
fertility rate. Not significant
H1g A higher rate of children born out of wedlock as a percentage of 
the total number of children Not significant
H1h Increased urbanization will have a detrimental effect on TFR. Not significant
H2a
Social spending on families by the Government is associated 
with higher rates of fertility.
Significant at 
5% only in the 
context of high 
SurvSelf 
values
H2b Increased prevalence of female part time employment has a 
positive effect on TFR
Rejected at 
0.001%
H3a Higher Traditional/Rational scores will be associated with 
lower levels of fertility. 
Confirmed at 
p=1%
H3b
Along the Survival/Self-expression cultural axis, increasing 
Self-Expression values are negatively related to TFR levels.
Confirmed at 
p=10%, not 
significant at 
5%
H3c
Above a certain threshold value, the relationship between 
Survival/Self-Expression values and TFR becomes positive, 
while the relationship is negative below it. 
Positive and 
significant at 
5% when 
associated 
with high 
Family 
Spending by 
Government
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The results from testing the hypotheses still leave us with one important question. It 
appears that Government spending for the social welfare of families as a percentage of 
GDP is only significant when associated with Survival-Self-expression values. What is 
the causal relationship here? Government largesse, especially in the form of social 
welfare, could create a sense of security and encourage people to abandon Survival 
values and, taking their continued survival for granted, embrace Self-Expression values. 
Alternatively, we know that one of the dimensions of Self-Expression is increased 
readiness to engage in political action, such as signing petitions and pressuring 
politicians. It could be that increased Self-Expression values have caused people to 
demand more of their government.   
 
Table 4.9: Survival-Self Expression values predict changes in Social spending for Families by the Government 5 
years later. The size of the effect is significant 
As we can see in Table 4.9, Survival-Self expression values predict changes in Family-
related social spending 5 years later, even when a measure of lagged spending is 
introduced into the model. The hypothesis that values cause spending cannot be rejected 
at this time, but far more work would be required to actually establish causation.  
  
 
"within" Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)
lag(GDPSpendFam, 5) 0.401044 0.042838 9.361959 5.24E-19
lag(TradRat, 5) 0.311933 0.174243 1.79022 0.074156
lag(SurvSelf, 5) 0.29295 0.09833 2.979246 0.003061
R-sq=.20, F=38, p<.000001
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Chapter 5 
Chapter 5 Conclusions 
  
At the conclusion of an extensive empirical testing of the literature on total fertility 
rates, what have we found out?  
The evidence has allowed us to reject a number of causative models: 
1. When controlling for other factors, there does not seem to be any shift towards 
a positive relationship between GDP per capita and Total Fertility Rates. The 
relationship appears strongly negative. Changes in income, by itself, when 
accounting for fixed effects remains strongly negative. This result may be in 
part caused by the presence of several poor countries still undergoing the first 
fertility transition at the start of the time-series, and undergoing rapid fertility 
decline and as well as achieving significant gains in GDP per capita.  
2. .The direct relationship between tertiary enrollment and fertility rates was 
actually found to be significantly negative. Each 10% increase in tertiary 
enrollment is associated with a fertility decline of 0.1 children. Even in the 
analysis of the most recent data in Chapter 3 the relationship was not positive. 
Admittedly, the data I use goes back to 1980, and Esping-Andersen's claim is 
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that the change is of a more recent nature, and part of the causation story she 
told was that of an interaction effect with female labor participation. 
3. There seems to be no significant relationship between the mean age of 
marriage or the proportion of children born out of wedlock and fertility rates. 
Data on the rate of cohabitation at the time the child is born would probably 
serve a useful purpose, separating the couples who live as if they were married 
without actually going through the formalities from the true single mothers. 
4. The presumed positive causal mechanism behind female part time 
employment and TFR has not been borne out by the data. Whether this is 
because of the confounders described in Chapter 3 or because there truly is no 
relationship between TFR and the availability of flexible part time positions 
remains to be seen. I the future, I plan to collect better data on workplace 
flexibility, that is, the ability of workers to set their own hours. 
 
There are also a number of hypotheses I was unable to reject on the basis of 
available evidence: 
1. I was unable to reject the idea that Survival-Self-Expression values are 
negatively related to fertility, except in the context where they are paired with 
high social security spending. Interestingly, social security spending in the 
absence of high self-expression orientation in the population was shown in the 
analysis in the previous chapter to be ineffective. This might explain the 
puzzling situation of Germany, where high social spending on families and 
lowest of the low fertility rates coexisted for years. Issues of collinearity 
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prevented a full test against all other variables, but I have provided the full test 
in the Appendix, and the direct relationship remains negative and significant, 
while the positive relationship intermediated through Government spending 
on families also remains positive and highly significant, even in the context of 
high collinearity noise.  
2. I was also unable to reject the hypothesis that Rational-Secular values are 
strong predictors of low fertility. A shift from 0 (about where the United 
States is located right now) to 1 (about where Germany is on the Traditional-
Rational secular axis) corresponds to a 0.3 decrease in total fertility rates, even 
when controlling for other determinants. Issues of collinearity prevented a full 
empirical test. 
3. There was no evidence on the basis on which to reject the hypothesis that 
there is an interaction between tertiary enrollment and labor force 
participation. One could read this in the context of the previous discussion on 
Esping-Andersen, and argue that highly educated women enter the labor force 
at a high wage rate and soon become established enough in their careers that 
the prospect of having children does not seem so daunting, at least from a 
financial security perspective.  
4. I was also unable to reject the simpler hypothesis that higher overall female 
labor force participation rates are linked to higher fertility. The discussion in 
chapter three suggests that either increased financial security derived from 
having two wage earners is the causal path, or perhaps that low levels of labor 
force participation are associated with very restrictive labor environments for 
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women, and each temporary exit from the labor force might make reentry 
problematic in the future, prompting many women to decrease the total 
number of children they have. 
5. In line with the Inglehart existential security story, increased unemployment is 
highly correlated with decreased fertility. This finding, just like the cultural 
values discussed before, has been tested in R with the perturb package which 
introduces noise in to the dataset. Being stuck at home without a job appears 
to be a powerful anaphrodisiac. 
 
Further study and more evidence will be needed before I will claim that any policy 
implications can be derived from this work. Even so, it does provide partial answers to 
some vexing questions? Why is social spending on families in Germany and Central 
Europe so ineffective? It seems that values play an important role. For rich, low fertility 
countries, the conclusion of this study is a dismal one, then. No quick solutions are in 
sight. As the rich world continues its slow transition towards ever rising levels of 
secularism, questions of sustainability will become more and more prevalent. The Nordic 
path, of high social security spending, seems to negate, in part the negative fertility 
effects of modernization. But even so, as societies age and elderly dependency ratios 
increase, the burden of such spending might become unbearable even for the Nordic 
democracies. Moreover, as comparatively poor and ill-governed middle-income 
economies collapse towards sub-replacement fertility at a pace much faster than the 
gentle decline so far seen in Europe, it is unclear that these new, poor graying countries 
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have either the administrative or the financial wherewithal to promote and sustain across 
decades Nordic levels of government engagement and spending.  
 
A lot of work remains to be done. There is a lot to expand and revise in this work. 
Primarily, this will involve painstaking data gathering, going beyond what is available in 
current databases. I found it perplexing that no data on workplace flexibility seems to be 
in the public domain, or even accessible via the university's system, even with the help of 
research librarians. If possible, I plan to build such a dataset and make it publicly 
available. Much more work is needed on the political side of this issue. I plan to gather 
data on child and family welfare legislation passed at the national level and aggregate it 
to produce a more refined tool that a brute percent of GDP spending level I was forced to 
use for the current work. In what political context are these laws passed? Is it nationalism 
or xenophobia? Mere fiscal prudence and commendable farsightedness? How do multi-
decadal fertility policies get implemented by democratic politicians with short time 
horizons? In many countries, pro-birth policies bring back dark memories of fascist 
policies or eugenic practices - even Sweden practiced forced sterilization at some point! 
Is this a serious impediment or merely a convenient excuse? 
Finally, I plan to expand my focus to encompass the rapidly transitioning lower-
middle income economies and examine their options for dealing with the coming 
demographic storm. Perhaps the doom-mongers predicting demographic collapse are on 
to something this time. And if not, well, debunking prophesies of doom is always fun. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)
GDPSpendFam 0.0025 0.0301 0.0821 0.9346
FPartTime -0.0102 0.0031 -3.2526 0.0012
LFP 0.0042 0.0050 0.8487 0.3966
Urban 0.0123 0.0053 2.2986 0.0221
lnGDP -1.7821 0.2138 -8.3351 0.0000
SurvSelf -0.4478 0.1047 -4.2753 0.0000
TradRat -0.0639 0.0626 -1.0198 0.3085
EducFemTer -0.0010 0.0027 -0.3794 0.7046
BirthOutWed 0.0042 0.0019 2.2118 0.0276
Unempl -0.0175 0.0029 -6.1447 0.0000
MeanFirstMarr 0.0546 0.0135 4.0353 0.0001
GDPSpendFam:SurvSelf 0.0710 0.0358 1.9816 0.0483
LFP:EducFemTer 0.00002 0.0000 0.5276 0.5981
R-sq=.33, F=14.2 p<0.00001
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0.1 Parameter estimates for County Fixed Effects Model 
Country Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
Albania 2.640867 0.055451 47.62544 0.000                   
Armenia 2.100667 0.055451 37.88346 0.000                   
Australia 1.842 0.055451 33.21866 0.000                   
Austria 1.446667 0.055451 26.08921 0.000                   
Azerbaijan 2.499637 0.055451 45.07849 0.000                   
Belarus 1.623 0.055451 29.26921 0.000                   
Belgium 1.636667 0.055451 29.51568 0.000                   
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1.59 0.055451 28.67409 0.000                   
Bulgaria 1.564333 0.055451 28.21122 0.000                   
Canada 1.61931 0.056399 28.71184 0.000                   
Croatia 1.582667 0.055451 28.54184 0.000                   
Cyprus 2.059 0.055451 37.13204 0.000                   
Czech Republic 1.568333 0.055451 28.28335 0.000                   
Denmark 1.674333 0.055451 30.19496 0.000                   
Estonia 1.707333 0.055451 30.79008 0.000                   
Finland 1.748 0.055451 31.52346 0.000                   
France 1.840333 0.055451 33.1886 0.000                   
Georgia 1.923667 0.055451 34.69144 0.000                   
Germany 1.359 0.055451 24.50823 0.000                   
Greece 1.487667 0.055451 26.82861 0.000                   
Greenland 2.4105 0.067913 35.49392 0.000                   
Hong Kong SAR China 1.267 0.055451 22.8491 0.000                   
Hungary 1.571333 0.055451 28.33745 0.000                   
Iceland 2.121333 0.055451 38.25616 0.000                   
Ireland 2.178667 0.055451 39.29011 0.000                   
Italy 1.335333 0.055451 24.08143 0.000                   
Japan 1.500333 0.055451 27.05704 0.000                   
Korea Rep. 1.607667 0.055451 28.99269 0.000                   
Latvia 1.589667 0.055451 28.66808 0.000                   
Lithuania 1.685333 0.055451 30.39333 0.000                   
Moldova 2.015 0.055451 36.33855 0.000                   
Netherlands 1.617 0.055451 29.16101 0.000                   
Norway 1.822333 0.055451 32.86399 0.000                   
Poland 1.757 0.055451 31.68577 0.000                   
Portugal 1.566 0.055451 28.24127 0.000                   
Romania 1.674 0.055451 30.18895 0.000                   
Russian Federation 1.607333 0.055451 28.98668 0.000                   
Serbia 1.702069 0.056399 30.17922 0.000                   
Slovak Republic 1.716 0.055451 30.94638 0.000                   
Slovenia 1.477667 0.055451 26.64827 0.000                   
Spain 1.426667 0.055451 25.72853 0.000                   
Sweden 1.776333 0.055451 32.03443 0.000                   
Switzerland 1.497667 0.055451 27.00895 0.000                   
Turkey 2.838 0.056399 50.3203 0.000                   
Ukraine 1.581667 0.055451 28.52381 0.000                   
United Kingdom 1.782 0.055451 32.13662 0.000                   
United States 1.977333 0.055451 35.65927 0.000                   
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 Figure 0.2: Urbanization and Fertility 
relationship in the one year snapshot data is probably just a fluke.
 
 
94 
 
 
- The data for all years shows no trend, indicating that the positive 
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